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Abstract 
We reasoned that observing high levels of cooperation among outgroup 
members might be threatening, causing perceivers to expect little cooperation across 
group boundaries.  Alternately, cooperation among outgroup members might be 
interpreted dispositionally, causing perceivers to expect cooperation to extend across 
group boundaries.  Across two studies, participants were assigned to a minimal group 
and observed a series of players – either outgroup-pairs, ingroup-pairs or intergroup-
pairs – play prisoner’s dilemma games and make overwhelmingly cooperative 
decisions (90%).  Results were consistent with the dispositional rather than the threat 
hypothesis.  Positive cooperative expectations and dispositional inferences for 
outgroup targets were greatest in the outgroup-pairs condition, followed by the 
intergroup condition, followed by the ingroup-pairs condition.  Effects were not 
moderated by a possible situational attribution (presence of a third party punisher).  
Without stereotypes or intergroup conflict, perception of outgroup targets was based 
on individual-level behavioral evidence – more instances of cooperation translated 
into stronger dispositional inferences. 
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Introduction 
 “If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with 
your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.” – Nelson Mandela 
These are insightful words by Nelson Mandela, who waged a multiple 
decades’ fight against the racial segregation policy (‘apartheid)’ of South Africa, and 
they are reflective of a process via which foes can become allies and hatred can turn 
into rapport. Nelson Mandela highlights that a solution to intergroup conflicts is to 
initiate cooperation across group boundaries, and psychologists have investigated 
the conditions under which trust can be built between members from two competing 
groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1991). For example, one common phenomenon in 
intergroup conflict is that members distribute more resources to their own group 
than to members of an outgroup; this differential treatment can be mitigated if group 
members who themselves have no contact with the competing group are made aware 
of the existence of a cross-group friendship (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & 
Ropp, 1997). In other words, instances of successful intergroup interactions can 
potentially increase an observer’s positive expectations for future cross-group 
cooperation. However, the existing literature rarely discusses what people infer from 
their observations of intergroup interactions, and whether this inferential process 
predicts the expectations for future cross-group cooperation. In the present studies, I 
will focus on the role of social attribution and investigate its influence on perceived 
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cooperative expectations (inferential aspect) and subsequent intergroup cooperation 
(behavioral aspect). 
Intergroup Trust 
According to Good (1988), “trust is based on an individual’s theory as to 
how another person will perform on some future occasion, as a function of that 
target person’s current and previous claims, either implicit or explicit, as to how 
they will behave.” The particular theory a person develops about how another 
individual is likely to behave in the future may be based on a number of factors, 
including prior experiences with the individual and reputational information about 
him or her (Deutsch, 1958; Luhmann, 1979). However, trust is not necessarily 
contingent on prior interpersonal contact (Brewer, 2008); in fact, it can be 
established in the absence of direct experiences with a target if we obtain other 
information that helps to establish their trustworthiness (Tanis & Postmes, 2005).  
For example, learning simply about their group membership can be a powerful 
source of information.  Even an arbitrarily assigned common group membership can 
foster trust among strangers (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Social dilemmas have been used to investigate how group identity induces 
cooperative behaviors. In social dilemmas, participants are presented with decisions 
in which personal goals and collective goals are in conflict. For example, in a 
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prisoners’ dilemma, the best joint outcome requires cooperation by both parties; 
although defection can possibly result in an outcome maximizing one’s own interest, 
it can also lead to the greatest collective losses if both parties simultaneously decide 
to defect. Considerable research has found that when people share a group 
membership, individuals make decisions that favor the group as a whole at the 
expense of their own interests (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 
1999; Tanis & Postmes, 2005). This results in, among other things, more 
cooperative behaviors among ingroup members in social dilemmas.  
Packer and Kugler (2013) proposed the Cooperative Contingencies Model 
(CCM) to articulate conditions when people are more or less likely to rely on 
common group identities to facilitate cooperation and trust. According to CCM, 
choices to selectively coordinate with ingroup members are prevalent in social 
interactions because group memberships provide predictable incentives. Individuals 
often need no prior knowledge about ingroup partners to trust them, believing that 
ingroup partners will act altruistically based on the group norm (Brewer, 2008; 
Tanis & Postmes, 2005). With respect to ingroup affiliation observed in social 
dilemmas, a debate has emerged over whether individuals treat their own group as 
“an interchangeable component” of themselves and thus show a genuine care for the 
group members due to a common group identity (Brewer, 2008; De Cremer & Van 
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Vugt, 1999; Tanis & Postmes, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or demonstrate ingroup 
preferences only because mutual reciprocity is forthcoming (Foddy, Platow, & 
Yamagishi, 2009; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). As is emphasized by social identity 
theory, loyalty and commitment to the group contribute to ingroup favoritism as a 
means of social coordination, especially in cases where there is competition or 
dislike between groups or when people are highly identified with their group (De 
Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002).  As such, it is likely 
that shifts in self-concept and expectations of reciprocity both contribute to 
heightened cooperation within group boundaries. 
Importantly, shared group memberships are not the only means to help 
achieve successful coordination (i.e., they are only one reason a person might have a 
“theory” that someone else will behave in a trustworthy fashion). Other factors or 
mechanisms can also facilitate cooperation – and if they are perceived as more 
effective than ingroup affiliation they might decrease intergroup biases. For 
example, when people believe that a mechanism or social institution that facilitates 
cooperation is effective enough to ensure social coordination, individuals may no 
longer prefer ingroup members over outgroup members. These are exactly our 
findings in a series of studies. We have found that when a cooperation-facilitating 
mechanism exists (e.g., the presence of a third party which either punishes unfair 
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transactions or rewards fair transactions in a trust game), individuals extend similar 
levels of trust toward ingroup and outgroup members, thereby decreasing intergroup 
biases that are prevalent in the absence of a cooperation-facilitating mechanism 
(Packer & Kugler, under review). These effects are strongest among weakly 
identified group members because they tend to freely adopt any effective strategy 
that enables successful coordination instead of being driven by motives or ideologies 
based on group identities (as highly identified group members tend to be). In a 
related study, we also found that individuals who were informed about the presence 
of a cooperation-facilitating mechanism displayed lower implicit racial bias toward 
outgroup members than did individuals who were not informed about the existence 
of the mechanism (Lin & Packer, 2014). (I will discuss this series of studies in depth 
in the section on sanctioning systems.) 
Taken together, people often perceive shared group memberships as an 
effective means to accomplish a positive social outcome. In situations that require 
cooperation, they may preferentially cooperate with ingroup members so as to 
achieve a desirable result if other cooperative affordances do not exist. Importantly 
for the current research, the extent to which groups are perceived as promising 
cooperative affordances is also likely to vary depending on how cohesive they are 
perceived to be – i.e., the extent to which members of that group are perceived to 
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like each other and work well together (Campbell, 1958). The more cohesive a 
group is perceived to be, the more its members are expected to contribute their 
efforts to accomplish a group goal or to perform collectively normative behaviors 
(Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998). Therefore, a highly cohesive group 
suggests a promising cooperative affordance if group goals are perceived as being 
compatible with the goals of an individual.  This should increase the likelihood that 
the individual will affiliate with the ingroup in order to achieve a favorable outcome. 
Conversely, if the goals of a group are perceived as incompatible with the goals of 
an individual, cohesiveness renders the group a less promising cooperative 
affordance; this may be particular likely when an outgroup is perceived as cohesive 
(Packer & Kugler, 2013).  
Perception of Intragroup Interactions  
Our research to date has focused on how people use group membership 
information to develop theories or expectations about the likely trustworthiness of 
other people – in the absence of other knowledge. These situations involve 
interacting with novel partners who participants have never interacted with or 
observed before. 
There are several approaches to investigate how group membership 
information influences interpretations of an individual’s behavior.  Scholars who 
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portray ingroup cooperation as heuristics declare that a heightened group identity 
can activate corresponding behaviors under different task structures (see review by 
Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). Brewer (2008) also remarks on this 
propensity to align one’s behaviors with a group cue as “a cooperative script” (p. 
221).  Researchers on stereotype activation and application approach this question 
by examining how social categories shape social perception (Blair, 2002; Devine, 
1989). They suggest that use of group memberships to interpret others’ behavior 
seems almost inevitable (Devine, 1989). In doing so, people do not perceive a social 
target as a unique individual, but instead interpret his or her behavior in the light of 
group templates (e.g., stereotypes). In other words, when a group membership is 
perceived and applied to interpret a social target’s behavior, the behavior has its 
meaning changed in line with the group identity.  
In the present studies, I am interested in how people interpret direct 
observations of cooperation among people belonging to different groups.  
Specifically, I investigate the attributions (and subsequently the trust decisions) that 
people make when they observe ingroup and outgroup members cooperating - both 
within and across group boundaries. 
In order to generate specific predictions, I will review the attribution 
literature and formulate a theoretical framework to understanding how cooperative 
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expectations may be inferred from observed intragroup/intergroup interactions, and 
how these inferences may affect subsequent cooperative behaviors. We aim to 
combine two lines of research— social attribution (e.g., Pettigrew, 1979) and 
strategic cooperation in economic games (e.g., Packer & Kugler, 2013). By doing 
so, we hope that this framework will help us to better understand: (1) how 
cooperative behaviors demonstrated by ingroup or outgroup partners engaging in 
intragroup/intergroup interactions may be interpreted differently, and (2) how these 
interpretations may influence perceived cooperative expectations and, in turn, alter 
the likelihood of engaging in subsequent cross-group cooperation. Broadly, we 
predict that because cooperative expectations may be asymmetrically inferred when 
observing cooperative acts among ingroup members vs. outgroup members, it may 
lead decision-makers to exhibit intergroup biases in subsequent interactions (see 
Figure 1).  
Classic attribution theories illuminate the ways in which people give 
explanations for others’ behaviors (Gilbert, 1998; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 
1965). Heider (1958) describes attribution processes in terms of a causal model, 
such that behaviors are teased apart into the components driven by an actor’s 
enduring qualities versus the components driven by their environments and 
situational causes. Close to our main interest in this project—perceptions of 
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cooperative dispositions of targets playing economic games—Jones and Davis 
(1965) and Kelley (1967) also address how people infer the dispositions of others 
from socially desirable behaviors. According to the covariation principles (Jones & 
Davis, 1965), the dispositions or intentions of an actor are inferred on the basis of 
the effects correlating or covarying with his or her behavior; the dispositions of an 
actor can be revealed if other people in the same situation would not behave in the 
same way (e.g., Ivy is cooperative because she sacrificed her sleep to work on a 
group project, whereas most of the people did not), or if an actor’s choice brings 
about an effect that cannot be attained by another choice (e.g., Ivan is cooperative 
because he could have took a day off from the group project, but he decided not to; 
Gilbert, 1998; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967).   
The key question for a decision-maker who observes other people behaving 
cooperatively is: to what extent is their behavior driven by stable individual 
cooperative dispositions (in which case they are likely to cooperate in the future) vs. 
driven by some external non-stable cause (in which case they may not cooperate 
going forward).  In group contexts, people may also make inferences about the 
groups to which the observed actors belong (see Figure 1)—discussed in more depth 
below. 
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How do groups influence attributions? Research has shown that the 
connotations of a behavior change along with group membership of the actor 
(Devine, 1989; Duncan, 1976).  For example, Duncan (1976) showed that an 
ambiguous behavior was rated by Caucasian college students as more aggressive if it 
was carried out by African American targets than by Caucasian American targets.  
Stereotyping can legitimize the status quo among groups (Hamilton & Sherman, 
1994), and attribution processes also play a crucial role in maintaining group 
boundaries by reproducing or confirming existing views of ingroups and outgroups 
(Pettigrew, 1979; Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, & Azam, 2005). The ultimate 
attribution error (a group-serving bias) refers to a bias to explain groups’ behaviors 
in a way that enhances ingroup superiority or confirms existing prejudices 
(Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Specifically, negative behaviors performed by 
outgroup members are more likely to be attributed to internal causes (i.e., 
dispositions or intentions), compared to the same behaviors performed by ingroup 
members.  In contrast, positive behaviors performed by outgroup members are more 
likely to be ascribed to external causes (i.e., situational factors), compared to the 
same behaviors performed by ingroup members.  
Following this logic, we predict that cooperation—a positive behavior—by 
outgroup members is more likely to be inferred as driven by causes other than 
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dispositions.  Cooperation by ingroup members, on the other hand, may be attributed 
to stable aspects of their personality.  In contrast, defection by outgroup members 
would more likely be attributed to malevolent intentions or dispositions, whereas 
equivalent acts of defection by ingroup members may be explained away 
situationally. Concretely, this implies that when decision-makers perceive exactly 
the same cooperative acts by ingroup and outgroup members, they are likely to infer 
that these behaviors reflect stable prosocial dispositions among ingroup members 
but are due to other external causes among outgroup members.   
What cause might perceivers infer drives cooperative behavior among 
outgroup members? Following from the Cooperative Contingencies approach, one 
key factor might be the fact that the target individuals share a common group 
membership. That is, perceivers may infer that outgroup members were only 
cooperative – with one another – because they share a common group membership. 
However, because they are not perceived as cooperative at an individual 
dispositional level, it may be assumed that they are unlikely to be cooperative 
outside their group boundaries (i.e., with people like the perceivers themselves) (see 
Figure 1).  
These type of attribution biases – if they exists – may then contribute to 
differential perception of cooperative opportunities afforded by ingroup and 
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outgroup members, and thereby influence subsequent cooperative decisions. 
According to CCM, decision-makers take all available cooperative affordances into 
account to predict the possibility of successful social coordination (Packer & Kugler, 
2013). As such, observing cooperation by ingroup members may evoke greater 
cooperative expectations (i.e., greater expectations that they will cooperate with 
participants themselves) than cooperation by outgroup members, due to the fact that 
cooperation by ingroup members is more likely to be attributed to internal causes 
such as genuine concern or cooperative dispositions than cooperation by outgroup 
members (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). In sum, an intergroup attribution bias 
may lead to asymmetric inferences about the cooperative opportunities afforded by 
ingroup vs. outgroup members, resulting in cooperative decisions in favor of 
ingroup affiliation (see Figure 1).  
Further, perceptual features of intragroup interactions may influence the 
inferences made not only about the meaning of individuals’ behavior, but also 
characteristics of the groups they belong to (see review by Yzerbyt, Corneille, & 
Estrada, 2001). For an observer, coordinated interactions among a group of social 
others may sometimes cause them to be perceived as part of a unified and cohesive 
group, a construct termed ‘entitativity’ (Campbell, 1958). Entitativity increases with 
factors such as perceptual proximity or similarity, as well as interdependence or a 
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common fate among targets. Research has shown that entitativity facilitates the use 
of group attributes in interpreting group behaviors (Yzerbyt & Rogier, 2001). For 
example, in a quiz game paradigm (Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977), questioners, 
who were participants randomly assigned to ask quizzes to others, were consistently 
rated by an observer as more intelligent than were participants randomly assigned to 
the role of answerers. This overattribution bias was magnified when the questioner 
or answerer group was described as highly entitative (i.e., coming from the same 
school) vs. weakly entitative (e.g., coming from different schools) (Yzerbyt, Rogier, 
& Fiske, 1998). Further, members of a highly entitative group are perceived as more 
likely to carry out negative behaviors (Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999), adopt 
malicious intentions (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Insko & Schopler, 
& Sedikides, 1998) and are believed to be more accountable for wrongdoings than 
members of a weakly entitative group (Newheiser, Sawaoka, & Dovidio, 2012).  
Whereas most prior research in this tradition has focused on inferences 
following negative outgroup behaviors (Dasgupta et al., 1999; Newheiser et al., 
2012), we are interested in the consequences of observing positive interactions 
among outgroup members. From the evidence above, we propose that observing 
cooperative intragroup interactions among outgroup members may impede 
subsequent intergroup cooperation. Based on the CCM and our earlier propositions, 
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we predict that if an outgroup is perceived as highly cohesive or entitative, its 
members will be regarded as less promising cooperative partners, which may 
increase intergroup bias.  If perceiving outgroup members cooperating with one 
another increases perceptions of cohesion, observations of this objectively positive 
behavior may, ironically, serve to increase bias. Further, outgroup interactions that 
make its members look coherent and unified may, on occasion, cause the outgroup 
to be perceived as more hostile and threatening (than if they had not been perceived 
to engage in a cooperative intragroup interaction). We propose that individuals’ 
levels of identification with their own group may influence the effects of perceptions 
of outgroup entitativity. As such, we propose that weakly identified group members 
may tend to situationally attribute outgroup interactions among outgroup members 
(e.g., due to a shared group membership), thus deeming outgroup members as less 
promising cooperative partners; in contrast, for highly identified group members, 
outgroup interactions may evoke threat and directly cause subsequent biased 
decisions. 
Perception of Intergroup Interactions 
Returning the example of Nelson Mandela with which we began, another 
important question has to do with how people interpret cooperative interactions 
between the members of different groups, extensive research on intergroup contact 
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has indicated many advantages of contact across group boundaries (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006): First, ingroup members who engage in a cross-group friendship can 
provide referent information to other group members about intergroup contact, 
suggesting that it is an accepted behavior within ingroup norms (Pettigrew, 1991; 
Wright et al., 1997). Second, observing intergroup contact initiated by ingroup 
members reduces anxiety that may be elicited due to unfamiliarity with an outgroup 
(Stroessner & Mackie, 1993). Third, intergroup interactions per se speak to the 
willingness of outgroup members to foster positive intergroup relationships (Wright 
et al., 1997).  
Given the evidence above, although personal contact with outgroups is not 
our main focus, it still provides a glimpse about possible mechanisms via which 
observing intergroup interactions may facilitate cooperative decisions in intergroup 
contexts. Compared to the mechanisms we elaborated above that might increase 
intergroup biases when intragroup cooperation among outgroup members is 
observed, observations of intergroup interactions may result in different inferences – 
especially about cooperating outgroup members (see Figure 2). In this case, their 
cooperation cannot be attributed to the external cause of a shared group membership 
– because they are cooperating across group lines. Further, intergroup cooperation 
should not increase perceptions of outgroup cohesion or entitativity, which 
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otherwise may give rise to feelings of threat.  As such, perceivers may make 
equivalently dispositional attributions for both ingroup and outgroup members. 
However, we believe that observing intergroup interactions may function differently 
depending on individuals’ levels of group identification. Observations of intergroup 
interactions may facilitate cooperative decisions of both highly and weakly 
identified individuals, however, via different routes (see Figure 2).  We predict that, 
as is theorized above, weakly identified members may infer that ingroup and 
outgroup members are equally dispositionally cooperative, and reach similar 
conclusions about cooperative opportunities afforded by ingroup and outgroup 
targets, thereby decreasing biased decisions. In contrast, we predict that observing 
intergroup interactions may function to create a group norm, which may especially 
encourage unbiased decisions for highly identified members, due to the fact that 
highly identified members are more strongly influenced by group norms than are 
weakly identified members (Terry & Hogg, 1996) (see Figure 2). 
An Alternate External Attribution: The Role of Sanctions   
As evidence for the sort of strategic intergroup biases posited by the CCM, 
prior research has found that effective sanctioning systems are associated with 
decreased intergroup biases in lab settings.  This conclusion is also supported by 
nationwide and international survey data, in which trust in social institutions like the 
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police, government and legal systems predicts lower levels of affiliative bias (Packer 
& Kugler, under review). Sanctioning systems help to ensure the outcomes of social 
coordination. Sanctioning systems can facilitate cooperation across group 
boundaries because people no long rely on group memberships as a means to secure 
social outcomes or prevent exploitation.  
For example, in a prior series of studies, participants engaged in several one-
shot trust games (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995), in which they could decide to 
allocate any amount of the points they were initially assigned in each round to a 
partner and save the rest for themselves. They were informed their partner would 
receive three times of their decided amount, after which their partner would decide 
how many points to return. This setting creates outcome dependence on their 
partner, and accordingly trust in their partner is crucial in determining decisions 
about how much to invest. In order to examine the role of cooperative-facilitating 
mechanisms for mitigating intergroup biases, previous investigations in our lab have 
varied the presence of sanctioning systems. For example, Packer and Kugler (under 
review) manipulated the presence vs. absence of a third-party punisher or rewarder. 
Similarly, Lin and Packer (2014), randomly assigned participants to conditions 
where a third-party punisher was absent or present. In our study 1, the only 
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difference between conditions was that participants in the punisher condition 
received an extra instruction:  
“A third player, Player C, will be watching what happens. Player C won’t 
know anything about Player A or B (e.g., won't see their photos). However, if 
Player B makes an unfair decision and sends too few points back to Player A, 
Player C has been instructed to remove most of Player B’s points. These points 
will disappear and nobody will get them.”1 
Consistent with previous literature on intergroup biases, our findings in 
conditions without effective cooperation-facilitating mechanisms showed that 
participants preferentially allocated more to their partners if they belonged to the 
ingroup instead of the outgroup (arbitrarily assigned novel groups in Packer & 
Kugler, under review). Critically, Packer and Kugler (under review) found that the 
presence of a third party punisher or rewarder reduced preferential trust in ingroup 
(over outgroup partners), especially among low-identified participants.  Similarly, 
faced targets of one’s own and other races (i.e., White and Black targets), White 
participants displayed an implicit racial bias when the punisher was absent:  positive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Participants in a second study were instead exposed to the information that varied whether their 
partners ostensibly knew about the presence of a punisher; half of them received the identical 
instruction as the punisher condition in the previous study, whereas the rest of them were told that 
their partner did not know about the existence of a punisher. The pattern of effects was the same. 
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concepts were more strongly associated with ingroup faces than outgroup faces, 
whereas negative concepts were more strongly associated with outgroup faces than 
ingroup faces, suggesting the existence of both ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation (in Lin & Packer, 2014). However, we found, in the punisher presence 
condition, implicit racial attitudes were tuned to the cooperative contingencies 
available in a context: specifically, the responses to positive words following Black 
faces were significantly facilitated, as opposed to the condition without a punisher.  
In other words, the presence of an effective cooperation-facilitating mechanism 
elevated the positive associations with outgroup faces to such an extent that it 
mirrored the evaluation of ingroup faces.  
These findings suggest that rapid evaluative biases and cooperative decisions 
result, in part, through strategically weighing cooperative affordances and other 
contingencies salient in a particular context. The efficacy of cooperative affordances 
determines which coordination strategy people adopt—when group memberships are 
perceived to be the most effective guarantees of cooperation (e.g., partners share the 
same membership information), their investment varies as a function of group 
memberships.  However, when another cooperation-facilitating mechanism is an 
effective guarantee of cooperation and influences the payoff structure (e.g., partners 
are aware of the sanctions), people forgo group memberships (at least if they are 
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weakly identified with their ingroup) and are equally cooperative regardless of their 
partners’ group identity.  
Because of the strong evidence we obtained about strategic cooperation, an 
attributional question then arises – Does this temporary intergroup cooperation 
enabled by the presence of effective social institutions like sanctioning systems 
attenuates positive dispositional attributions because it provides an alternate 
situational attribution? That is, they may believe that cooperation by their partners 
simply results from situational requirements instead of anything intrinsically 
motivated.  
Empirical studies on sanctioning systems suggest that they can breed distrust 
among people and encourage unethical behaviors in the absence of sanctions (e.g., 
Cialdini, 1996). Similarly, sanctions may propel an economic decision frame instead 
of an ethical one (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), and evoke greater consideration of 
defection when avoiding sanctions becomes possible (Mulder, Van Dijk, De 
Cremer, & Wilke, 2006a).  Research also suggests that the presence of sanctions 
serves as a salient external cause of cooperative behaviors. Such attributions are 
likely to reduce inferences about internal motivation to cooperate (Cialdini, 1996; 
Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006b). Further, Mulder et al. (2006b) 
found that the presence of sanctioning systems dampens trust when sanctions no 
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longer exist, especially among individuals who were intrinsically motivated to trust 
or who were initially led to believe their partners were trustworthy.  
Based on attribution theories, sanctions covarying with cooperation by an 
actor make his or her intentions open to explanations other than internal causes, such 
as prosociality or cooperativeness (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). As such, we 
posited that the sanctions may become the main cause that an observer believes to 
drive an actor’s behavior, leaving dispositional or group-based causes as less 
explanatory (see Figure 3). Study 2 introduced sanctioning systems into our 
framework, examining whether sanctions altered attributions following observations 
of cooperative intragroup or intergroup interactions.  Specifically, we investigated to 
what extent the benefits of observing cooperative intergroup interactions (e.g., 
formation of equivalent cooperative expectations for the ingroup and outgroup as 
mentioned in the previous section) were eliminated when a sanctioning system 
existed. Overall, we expected that participants would increase causal inferences 
related to sanctions (e.g., a fear of being punished) and therefore reduce attributions 
to both dispositional causes and a shared group membership in the presence of a 
sanctioning system.  
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Overview 
In the present studies, we investigated how people would infer cooperative 
dispositions and opportunities from intragroup/intergroup interactions, and to what 
extent they made cooperative decisions in line with these inferences. We focused on 
how the inferences about cooperative expectations would be unequally drawn due to 
biased attributions of ingroup vs. outgroup interactions and in turn cause 
discriminative cooperative decisions. Study 1 focused on attributions made when 
individuals observed cooperation within ingroup boundaries, outgroup boundaries 
and across group lines.  These conditions were contrasted to two control conditions, 
in which participants observed an ingroup or an outgroup member cooperating with 
a target whose group membership was unknown.  In Study 2, following some 
methodological adjustments based on the results of Study 1, we investigated how an 
alternate situational force – a sanctioning system – would affect these attribution 
processes. 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 examined whether individuals would engage in biased attribution 
processes, such that cooperation by outgroup members tended to be externally 
attributed (to the fact that they share a group membership), whereas cooperation by 
ingroup members tended to be internally attributed. Participants observed a scenario 
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with two players participating in a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game and rapidly 
settling to cooperative choices within 3 rounds (out of a total of 10 rounds). We 
hoped to demonstrate that due to attribution biases, greater cooperative expectations 
would be inferred from observing cooperation by ingroup players than by outgroup 
players despite them displaying what was objectively the same level of cooperation. 
Furthermore, Study 1 was also designed to investigate whether observations of 
cooperative intergroup interactions would mitigate intergroup biases. Intergroup 
interactions may give rise to equally cooperative expectations for both ingroup and 
outgroup targets for weakly identified members, whereas they may serve as a 
guiding group norm for highly identified members.  
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred and fifty-six participants were recruited online through 
Mechanical Turk for a monetary reward of $1.  The study had a 5 (scenario: 
Ingroup–Ingroup vs. Outgroup–Outgroup vs. Intergroup vs. Ingroup–Control vs. 
Outgroup–Control) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
The ostensible purpose of the study was “to investigate people’s 
understanding of behavior in social decision-making tasks.”  Participants were 
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introduced to a dot estimation task modified from Howard and Rothbart (1980) and 
Gerard and Hoyt (1974): “First of all, you will be participating in a task relating to 
how people make quantitative judgments.  Past studies have shown that, given the 
task of estimating how many objects they have seen, different people tend to 
consistently overestimate or underestimate the correct number.  The number of 
overestimators and underestimators in the population seem to be about equal. While 
psychologists do not place any value judgment on whether it is better to be an 
overestimator or an underestimator, past studies have shown that whether one is an 
overestimator or an underestimator tends to reveal something fundamental about 
one's psychological characteristics and personality.  As such, we will use this 
information to classify participants in this study into groups.” Participants were 
asked to estimate the number of dots on three paintings: “How many dots do you 
think there were?" Each painting was displayed on the screen for 3 seconds; after 
the painting disappeared, participants were asked to enter their answer in a blank. 
Right after they finished the task, the program randomly generated their testing 
results as an overestimator or an underestimator so that half of the participants were 
assigned to the team of “underestimators,” whereas the other half were assigned to 
“overestimators.”   
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They were told that “for the rest of the study, you will be part of a group with 
several other [underestimators/ overestimators],” and that their next mission was to 
observe interactions between two players who previously attended a related study 
and to respond to a series of questions about these interactions.  The instruction 
read: “you will observe the behavior of two people playing a series of games 
together.  These individuals were prior participants in a related study, and we are 
interested in your impressions of their behaviors. Please try to discern the motives 
behind the players’ behaviors, and attempt to be as accurate as you can because 
later on we will present you several questions regarding their behaviors in these 
games.”  
The introduction about the Prisoners’ Dilemma game was subsequently 
presented to familiarize participants with the rules: “We will first introduce the rules 
of this game. Two people play this game for points.  On every round, each player 
chooses whether to COOPERATE with the other player or to DEFECT (i.e., not 
cooperate). Each player makes his or her decision without knowing the other 
player's choice.  However, the outcome (points) that each player earns in the game 
depends on their choice in combination with what the other player chose." The 
possible outcomes of this game were shown in a matrix (see Appendix 1) on the 
screen, followed by instructions: “If both of the players choose to cooperate, they 
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both earn 40 points; if one player defects and the other cooperates, the player who 
defects earns 60 points, whereas the person who cooperates earns 0 (zero) points; if 
both of the players defect, they both earn 20 points. The best thing for both players 
as a collective is to cooperate with each other.  However, the best thing for each 
individual is to defect while his/her partner cooperates.  These incentives typically 
make cooperation difficult, though not impossible. ” 
After fully understanding the rules, participants saw the photographs of two 
players posed in the upper-right corner and the upper-left corner of the screen. 
Before proceeding to the pages that contained the players’ decisions, they were told: 
“Some prior participants were overestimators and some were underestimators.  If 
their group membership is known, it will be displayed with their 
decisions/outcomes.  (Note: some participants did not complete the dot estimation 
task - in these cases, the display will read 'unknown membership’).” The decisions 
of both players were presented in the center of the screen once per round; the result 
stayed on the screen till participants pressed the ‘continue’ button. We controlled 
that each player defected only once in either the 2nd or 3rd round and both of them 
cooperated after the 3rd round until the end (see Appendix 2).  In the intergroup 
scenario, we randomized either an ingroup player or an outgroup player to defect 
28 
 
first in the 2nd round of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Overall, participants observed 
high levels of cooperation from both players.   
Our key manipulation scenarios in this study were five conditions 
constructed by varying the team memberships (underestimator vs. overestimator) of 
the two players (see an example in Appendix 3). In two control conditions (i.e., 
Ingroup–Control and Outgroup–Control), only one player’s team membership was 
revealed whereas the other’s was shown as “unknown membership.” In this way, 
they served as a baseline in comparison with other experimental conditions. The 
experimental conditions included intragroup interactions either among ingroup 
targets (Ingroup-Ingroup scenario), or among outgroup targets (Outgroup-Outgroup 
scenario), and intergroup interactions (Intergroup scenario).  
Dependent Variables 
Our crucial dependent variable was dispositional attribution of each player 
(e.g., “to what extent do you believe this player is trustworthy?” see Appendix 4).  
In order to probe into participants’ inferences about fundamental personalities of 
each player, they were encouraged to think about what each player was like “deep 
down in terms of their fundamental personality traits.”  Traits included friendly, 
trustworthy, cooperative and six other traits tapping into perceived cooperativeness 
of each player (α = .949 for Player 1; α = .951 for Player 2), along with three filler 
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traits egalitarian, competent, and intelligent.  For this and following measures, the 
photograph of the relevant player was posed in the center of the screen.  
Complementary to the dispositional attribution measure, three critical items in the 
behavioral inference scale probed into the extent to which each player’s 
cooperativeness disposition was accountable for his behavior (including “this 
player took the other player’s needs into account when making decisions”; “this 
player genuinely cared about the other player in these games”; “this player would 
have behaved in the same way no matter who he was playing with.” see Appendix 
5)2. Items in the behavioral inference scale were modified from Van Hiel, Vanneste, 
and De Cremer’s (2008) attribution scale. 
In addition to the items regarding dispositional attributions, the behavioral 
inference scale also consisted of situational causes accountable for the players’ 
behaviors (see Appendix 5).  Participants were asked to rate how possible each 
cause resulted in each player’s behavior.  In particular, three items were designed to 
assess the extent to which they thought each target’s behavior was attributable to 
their group membership (including “this player's decisions were influenced by the 
group membership of his partner”; “this player would have made different decisions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 In order to construct the dimensions of behavioral causes, we will further conduct an exploratory 
factor analysis on the behavioral inference scale in the data analysis section. 
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if the group membership of his partner had been different”; “the fact that this player 
shared or did not share a group membership with his partner is important for 
understanding his behavior in these games”). Other situational causes (such as “this 
player wanted to maximize his own payoff”; “this player wanted to avoid negative 
evaluations from the other player”) were listed in Appendix 5.  
Participants further rated the perceived entitativity of each group (e.g., 
“they were well coordinated”; α =.910 for the overestimators; α =.904 for the 
underestimators; see Appendix 6), perceived outgroup threat (e.g., “I think that the 
[underestimator] group is a strong rival to my group”; α =.841 for rated threat from 
the overestimators; α =.793 for rated threat from the underestimators; see Appendix 
7), perceived group norms (e.g., “to what extent do you think watching the players 
provided me with useful information about how people in general should play these 
games?”; α = .777 for the overestimators; α = .791 for the underestimators; see 
Appendix 8).  At about this point, participants completed an ingroup identification 
scale (e.g, “To what extent do you feel a bond with [overestimators/ 
underestimators]”; α = .955 for the overestimators; α = .957 for the underestimators; 
see Appendix 10). 
Participants also indicated their cooperative expectations for both players 
(e.g., “Please imagine if you were the other player in the game with your picture and 
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group membership revealed to this player…to what extent do you believe this player 
would cooperate with you? ”, “to what extent do you believe this player would be 
motivated to maximize your outcome?”; α = .902 for Player 1; α =.906 for Player 2; 
see Appendix 9).  Finally, they subsequently made their own cooperative decisions 
with regard to new players from each team. Participants were told that they would 
play a different form of economic games with other participants recruited online. 
The rule was that participants were first given 500 points in each round and they 
could decide any amount to send to their partners in this round and saved the rest for 
themselves; the amount sent would be multiplied by 3 and then given to their 
partners, and their partners could decide any amount to send back to them.  
Participants then played 8 rounds of trust games, 4 rounds with ingroup players and 
4 rounds with outgroup players; these players were novel and never participated in 
the earlier phase.  In each round, a player’s photograph was posed in the center of 
the screen.  After the trust games, participants then filled out questions about their 
political orientation and demographic information. Upon accomplishment of the 
experiment, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
Predictions  
Prediction 1. We predicted that cooperation by an ingroup player would lead 
to more positive dispositional attributions than cooperation by an outgroup player.  
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By comparing the effects of observing the scenarios involving only ingroup or 
outgroup players (i.e., the homogeneous and control conditions) on our dependent 
variables, we examined if an ultimate attribution bias would contribute to lowered 
cooperative expectations and cooperative decisions toward outgroup partners (vs. 
ingroup partners) in the trust games. That is, we expected that an ingroup player 
would be perceived as more dispositionally cooperative than an outgroup player, 
whereas observed cooperation by an outgroup player would be perceived as 
externally/situationally induced (i.e., due to a shared group membership), thus 
leading to subsequently biased cooperative decisions. 
Prediction 2. Observing cooperative intragroup interactions among outgroup 
players would reduce cooperative expectations and lead to biased decisions toward 
outgroup partners, compared to observing an outgroup actor cooperating with an 
unknown-identity player. The underlying mechanism was hypothesized to differ 
depending on individuals’ identification levels: weakly identified individuals were 
expected to attribute outgroup players’ cooperation with each other to causes other 
than dispositions (e.g., a shared group membership), whereas highly identified 
individuals were expected to perceive more threat in the observations of outgroup 
cooperation (vs. observations of an outgroup actor interacting with an unknown-
identity player).  By comparing the effects of Outgroup-Control and Outgroup-
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Outgroup on our key dependent variables, we first tested whether observing 
intragroup cooperation among outgroup members did lower cooperative 
expectations and induce biased decisions toward outgroup partners in the trust 
games.  The predicted mediation routes for highly and weakly identified individuals 
were also examined. For weakly identified individuals, the effects of scenario on 
cooperative expectations may be mediated by reduced dispositional or heightened 
situational inferences. In contrast, for highly identified individuals, the relationship 
between observing outgroup-outgroup cooperation and cooperative expectations 
may be mediated by heightened perceptions of cohesiveness, leading to greater 
perceptions of intergroup threat (see Figure 1).  
Prediction 3. Observing intergroup interactions was expected to boost 
cooperative expectations, and encourage less biased decisions toward outgroup 
partners in the trust games, compared to observing intragroup interactions among 
ingroup players or among outgroup players. The underlying mechanism was 
hypothesized to differ depending on individuals’ identification levels: observing 
cooperative intergroup interactions, weakly identified individuals may make more 
dispositional (and less situational) attributions of outgroup players (i.e., perceiving 
them as more dispositionally cooperative), whereas highly identified individuals 
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may follow a salient group norm which highlighted the normativity of intergroup 
cooperation (see Figure 2).  
Data Analysis 
Sixteen participants were removed from the analysis for failing to correctly 
report their assigned team, as measured in a manipulation check.  Twelve 
participants with completion times lower than half of the median of all the 
participants (Median = 14 minutes) were also excluded. Applying both criteria 
resulted in a sample size of 328 (Ingroup-Ingroup = 64; Outgroup-Outgroup = 70; 
Intergroup = 66; Ingroup-Ctrl = 60; Outgroup-Ctrl = 68).   
The behavioral inference scale contained 12 items. An exploratory factor 
analysis was conducted with oblique rotation (“Promax” method in SPSS) to extract 
the factors from attributions about behaviors of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively.  
By using oblique rotation, we assumed the factors were correlated.  The criteria to 
determine the factors were based on the scree plot and interpretability of the 
classification consistent with attribution theories.  The results based on the behaviors 
of Player 1 and Player 2 were similar3 (see the loadings on each factor in Table 1): 
four factors emerged and explained around 66% of the variance.  However, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 There were two inconsistent results with respect to the behaviors of Player 1 and Player 2 in the 
factor analysis.  For the convenience of further analysis, we only kept and interpreted the factor with 
a higher loading for both of the items. 
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result was not entirely consistent with our classification of items as mentioned in the 
method section.  The first factor included items 1, 2, 3 and 6, referring to attributions 
related to a shared group membership.  The second factor was composed of items 4, 
5, and 8, indicating genuine concern for others and mutual reciprocity. The third 
factor included items 10, 11, and 12, linked to risk-prevention causes.  The forth 
factor consisted of items 7 and 9, suggesting causes related to strategic cooperation – 
i.e., players would only cooperate if the situation was in their favor.  Scores within 
the same factors were averaged, thus representing to what degree the behavior of 
each player was ascribed to four types of causes.   
However, due to the high correlations (rs = .549 ~ .647) among the key 
dependent variables (i.e., dispositional attributions, the concern-for-other cause, and 
cooperative expectations), a single standardized score was created for each 
participant indicating dispositional attributions about each player. The steps were as 
follows. We first standardized the scores on the 9 items of the dispositional 
attribution measure, 3 items (i.e., items 4, 5 and 8) of the concern-for-other cause, 
and 4 items of the cooperative expectation scale, and we then averaged these 
standardized scores together4.  The higher this averaged score was, the more they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This averaged score consists of all the responses we measured about dispositional attributions, and 
weights them equally. From our perspective, the computing method is relatively open to debate. An 
alternate computing method would be to first average the scores of each subscale, standardize these 
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attributed a player’s cooperation to his disposition.  We used this averaged score 
instead of the scores on individual subscales for the following analyses.  
Results 
Ultimate Attribution Error  
The first hypothesis in Study 1 was that cooperation by ingroup players was 
more likely to be attributed to dispositional cooperativeness than cooperation by 
outgroup players; further, cooperation by outgroup players was more likely to lead 
to situational attributions (i.e., a shared group membership) in comparison.  To test 
this (Prediction 1), in this section we first analyzed whether behaviors of ingroup 
players engaging in intragroup cooperation or cooperation with unknown-identity 
players would receive greater dispositional attributions than behaviors of outgroup 
players.  Further, we examined whether behaviors of ingroup players involved in 
intergroup cooperation would also be attributed differently from behaviors of 
outgroup players.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
means and take their average. In this way, the new score would consist of three components from 
each subscale with equal weights. We further examined the results based on the both methods, but it 
did not yield any difference in our important findings, suggesting that our manipulation seemed to 
cause a stable change and fluctuation among participants’ responses on disposition-related items 
regardless of the composition of the computing score. 
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For the first analysis, the dependent variables: (1) dispositional attributions; 
(2) situational attributions to shared group membership5 were examined between the 
conditions with only ingroup players involved (i.e., Ingroup-Ingroup and Ingroup-
Ctrl scenarios) and the conditions with only outgroup players involved (i.e., 
Outgroup-Outgroup and Outgroup-Ctrl scenarios).  Responses to the two players in 
the Ingroup-Ingroup and Outgroup-Outgroup scenarios were averaged for 
participants in the homogeneous conditions, whereas for the control conditions, 
scores were based only on the player with his team membership revealed (ingroup or 
outgroup).  Dispositional attributions and shared-group-membership attributions 
were analyzed with 2 (scenario type: Homogeneous vs. Control) x 2 (player 
membership: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) between-subject factorial ANOVAs.  If 
participants displayed an ultimate attribution error, ingroup players should be rated 
as more dispositionally cooperative than outgroup players. However, the main effect 
of player membership was not significant: participants did not perceive ingroup 
players (M = .081) as significantly more cooperative than outgroup players (M = -
.065) across the two scenario types, F(1, 258) = 2.627, p = .106.  None of other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 All the analyses were also conducted on other dependent variables such as risk-prevention cause, 
strategic-cooperation cause, and group perception (i.e., perceived group norms, perceived entitativity, 
and outgroup threat). However, since we did not find evidence that these behavioral causes 
functioned as external attributions for cooperation, nor did these findings contribute to interpretation 
of the attribution model, we report the findings in Appendix 13.   
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effects was significant, Fs < 1.  We also anticipated that cooperation by outgroup 
players should be attributed to a shared group membership more than cooperation by 
ingroup players.  However, the main effect of player membership on shared-group-
membership attributions was not significant, and neither was the scenario type x 
player membership interaction, Fs < 1, indicating that participants did not make 
situational attributions differently in the face of ingroup or outgroup cooperation. 
We found only a significant main effect of scenario type on shared-group-
membership attributions, F(1, 258) = 7.073, p = .008.  Within-group cooperation led 
to greater attributions related to a shared group membership (M = 4.013) than 
cooperation with an unknown-identity player (M = 3.588).  To this point, our 
findings suggest that observing highly cooperative behaviors by ingroup vs. 
outgroup players did not cause a difference in dispositional or situational attributions 
in favor of ingroup members.  
In a second analysis to examine the ultimate attribution error, we tested 
whether ingroup players were perceived differently from outgroup players in the 
intergroup scenario.  If participants displayed an ultimate attribution error, they 
would judge ingroup players in a cross-group interaction as more cooperative than 
outgroup players. We first examined dispositional attributions and shared-group-
membership attributions for participants being assigned to observe the intergroup 
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scenario with 2 (player membership: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) within-subject factorial 
ANOVAs. Similar to our results for the homogeneous conditions, the main effect of 
player membership was only marginally significant: ingroup players (M = .067) in 
the intergroup interaction seemed to be perceived as only slightly more cooperative 
than outgroup players (M = -.105), F(1, 65) =  3.635, p = .06.  As for attributions to 
a shared group membership, the main effect of player membership did not reach a 
significant level, F(1, 65) < 1. Taken together, in the scenario that members 
cooperated across group boundaries, ingroup players were not perceived as more 
dispositionally cooperative than outgroup players, neither were outgroup players 
perceived as more situationally cooperative than ingroup players.  
Consequences of Outgroup Cooperation 
In Prediction 2, we hypothesized that outgroup players might be perceived as 
less cooperative when they engaged in intragroup cooperation than when they 
engaged in cooperation with a player with an unknown identity.  Furthermore, we 
expected that this effect may be different as a function of group identification.  
Participants’ identification scores were first standardized.  Hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses were conducted with scenario type (effect coded: 1 = Outgroup-
Outgroup; -1 = Outgroup-Control), identification and the interaction term predicting 
dispositional attributions and attributions to a shared group membership.  We 
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anticipated a significant scenario type × identification interaction.  The interaction 
item significantly predicted attributions to the shared-group-membership cause (β = 
.275, p = .001) but not dispositional attributions (β = .052, p = .53).  Specifically, 
strong identifiers perceived the behaviors of observed players in the Outgroup-
Outgroup scenario as more likely to be driven by a common group identity than 
behaviors of those in the Outgroup-Ctrl scenario (β = .435, p < .001), whereas weak 
identifiers observing these two scenarios made a similar degree of shared-group-
membership attributions (β = -.113, p = .284)6.  Taken together, observations of 
outgroup cooperation indeed increased attributions to a shared group membership, 
especially among highly identified individuals; however, our second hypothesis was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 It is worth noting that although outgroup cooperation did not elicit more perceived outgroup 
entitativity or outgroup threat compared to the control condition (β = .092, p = .211; β = -.019, p = 
.797), we found that overall strong vs. weak identifiers perceived the outgroup differently. 
Hierarchical regression analyses were implemented with identification, perceived outgroup 
entitativity and the interaction term predicting perceived outgroup threat across these two scenarios. 
We found that perceived outgroup threat was positively correlated with group identification (β = 
.561, p < .001) after controlling for outgroup entitativity, and the degree of threat elicited by outgroup 
entitativity depended on group identification (β = -.112, p = .01): for weak identifiers, the more 
cohesive the outgroup was perceived, the higher the level of threat it triggered (β = .158, p = .009), 
whereas this correlation was absent for strong identifiers (β = -.027, p = .67): outgroup threat was 
readily perceived by strong identifiers regardless of outgroup cohesiveness (strong identifiers–whose 
group identification were 1 S.D. higher than averaged–rated outgroup threat as 4.939 out of 7 when 
their perceived outgroup entitativity was low, and rated outgroup threat as 4.617 when their perceived 
outgroup entitativity was high; weak identifiers rated outgroup threat as 1.414 with low perceived 
outgroup entitativity and as 2.088 with high perceived outgroup entitativity).  
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not supported that exposures to outgroup cooperation would reduce perceptions of 
dispositional cooperativeness. 
Intergroup Interactions vs. Intragroup Interactions 
 We then examined whether observations of intergroup cooperation would 
give rise to different dispositional or situational inferences compared to observations 
of intragroup cooperation.  According to Prediction 3, intergroup cooperation should 
reduce attributions to a shared group membership, and thus boost the perceived 
cooperativeness of outgroup players, compared to intragroup cooperation among 
outgroup players. We expected that weakly identified individuals would be the most 
likely to follow this pattern that cooperative behaviors of outgroup players in 
intergroup interactions would elicit more dispositional attributions than those in 
intragroup interactions. In contrast, intergroup interactions per se would be 
considered as group norms by highly identified individuals and would directly 
encourage them to cooperate across group lines.  As such, we first examined 
dispositional attributions and shared-group-membership attributions about outgroup 
players with scenario (effect coded: 1 = Intergroup scenario; -1 = Outgroup-
Outgroup scenario), identification and the interaction term. We anticipated a 
significant interaction effect, indicating the effect of observing intergroup 
cooperation varied as individuals’ level of group identification changed. However, 
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the interaction effect was not significant in predicting either dispositional 
attributions (β = -.083, p = .307) or shared-group-membership attributions about 
outgroup players (β = -.053, p = .500). We only found that individuals’ level of 
group identification positively predicted both dispositional attributions (β = .358, p 
< .001) and shared-group-membership attributions about outgroup players (β = .439, 
p < .001). Although observations of intergroup cooperation itself did not influence 
attributions about outgroup players, the more individuals identified with their group, 
the more they tend to attribute cooperative behaviors of an outgroup to both their 
disposition and group identity.  
Inferences about ingroup players were also examined. Hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses were conducted with scenario (effect coded: 1 = Intergroup 
scenario; -1 = Ingroup-Ingroup scenario), identification and the interaction term 
predicting dispositional or behavioral inferences about ingroup players.  Neither the 
main effect of scenario nor interaction effect was significant (ts ≤ 1), indicating that 
observations of intergroup cooperation itself did not alter attributions about ingroup 
players’ behaviors relative to observations of ingroup cooperation, and this 
relationship did not vary as a function of group identification. However, individuals’ 
level of group identification positively predicted both dispositional attributions (β = 
.359, p < .001) and shared-group-membership attributions about ingroup players (β 
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= .300, p = .001). In conclusion, composition of team membership of the players did 
not influence cooperativeness inferences about either ingroup or outgroup players. 
However, unexpectedly, regardless of the observed scenarios, strong identifiers 
made more dispositional and shared-group-membership attributions about 
cooperative behaviors of members from both groups, compared to weak identifiers. 
One limitation in Study 1 is that we focused on participants’ inferences about the 
observed players, and thus their responses to potential players left unexamined. For 
instance, we did not measure attributions about outgroup members among 
participants observing the Ingroup-Ingroup scenario since they did not observe any 
outgroup target.  This design was modified in Study 2 so that we could directly 
compare participants’ inferences about both ingroup and outgroup members across 
all the scenarios.  
Ingroup Bias – Allocations in Trust Games 
Mere team assignment should lead to ingroup bias - i.e., a preference to 
affiliate with ingroup partners over outgroup partners (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  This hypothesis was examined by testing whether the 
allocations in the trust games would vary with partner membership:  Participants 
demonstrated ingroup bias if they sent more points to ingroup partners than to 
outgroup partners.  Allocations in the trust games were examined with a partner 
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membership (within-subject: ingroup vs. outgroup) x scenario (between-subject: 
Ingroup-Ingroup vs. Outgroup-Outgroup vs. Intergroup vs. Ingroup-Ctrl vs. 
Outgroup-Ctrl) factorial ANOVA.  The main effect of partner membership was 
significant, F(1, 322) = 18.198, p < .001: the average amount allocated to ingroup 
partners (M = 230.883) was more than the average amount allocated to outgroup 
partners (M = 209.067). However, neither the interaction of scenario and partner 
membership, F(4, 322) < 1, nor the main effect of scenario reached a significant 
level, F(4, 322) = 1.907, p = .109.  Statistically, only participants observing 
Intergroup or Ingroup-Ingroup scenarios showed ingroup bias: they allocated around 
30.402 points and 34.313 points more to ingroup partners than to outgroup partners 
respectively, t(65) = 2.675, p = .008; t(63) = 2.973, p = .0037, whereas participants 
observing the other scenarios did not show this bias, ts < 1.617, ps > .107 (see 
Figure 4). As previous studies have repeatedly replicated, team assignment elicited 
preferential trust in ingroup partners over outgroup partners, but the extent of 
ingroup preference did not differ with the scenarios participants observed.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 When the most stringent correction method—Bonferroni correction—was used to avoid the 
likelihood of a Type I error for multiple comparisons, the results were still significant (the significant 
level was alpha divided by comparison number, which yielded a new critical value equal to .01).  
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Defection Order 
During data analysis, we speculated that defection order might matter for 
inferences about players’ cooperativeness even in the homogeneous conditions: 
Behaviors of the players who defected first may be interpreted differently from 
behaviors of the other players who defected second, because defections by the 
second defectors could be perceived as a reasonable response to the first defectors. 
Specifically, we anticipated that first defectors would be rated as less cooperative 
than second defectors, and that the extent to which perceived dispositional 
cooperativeness was discounted by first defection might depend on players’ group 
membership.  Dispositional attributions were analyzed with a player membership 
(between-subject: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) × defection order (within-subject: First vs. 
Second) mixed-model ANOVA.  If first defectors were perceived differently 
depending on their membership, a player membership × defection order interaction 
should be observed.  However, the interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 132) = 
2.352, p = .1468.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 A simple main effect of player membership for first defectors almost reached the significant level: 
Outgroup first defectors (M = -.135) were perceived as slightly less cooperative than ingroup first 
defectors (M = .160), F(1, 132) = 4.605, p = .034 (the criterion for significance was .025 because two 
simple main effect tests were conducted), whereas second defectors of both group memberships were 
perceived as equally cooperative (Ms = .036 for ingroup vs. -.051 for outgroup), F(1, 132) < 1.   
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We also examined whether similar biases in inferences occurred in the 
intergroup scenario. If participants observing the intergroup scenario displayed an 
ultimate attribution error, outgroup first defectors would be perceived as less 
cooperative than ingroup first defectors; in particular, outgroup players who 
defected against an ingroup player first might be perceived as especially 
uncooperative. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with membership of 
first defectors (between-subject: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) × defection order (within-
subject: First vs. Second) predicting dispositional attributions about the two players 
in the intergroup scenario.  We anticipated membership of first defectors × defection 
order interactions on attributions, as well as simple main effects of defection order at 
different levels of first defector membership. However, interaction effect was only 
marginally significant, F(1, 64) = 3.589, p = .063.  The simple main effect that 
examining perceived cooperativeness of second defectors by their group 
membership were not significant, F(1, 64) = 2.849, p = .096, suggesting that ingroup 
players who were defected against by outgroup (M = .126) looked like slightly more 
cooperative than outgroup players who were defected against by ingroup (M = -
.178), whereas ingroup first defectors did not look differently from outgroup first 
defectors, F(1, 64) < 1.  None of other effects was significant, Fs < 1.  Overall, in 
Study 1, we did not obtain evidence regarding disparate dispositional attributions 
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about ingroup vs. outgroup players; furthermore, we ruled out the possibility that 
defection order would affect cooperativeness inferences about ingroup vs. outgroup 
members differently. 
STUDY 2 
 In study 1, the evidence regarding how observing scenarios with different 
membership compositions affected cooperativeness inferences was not as strong as 
we anticipated.  One reason may be that the impressions about ingroup vs. outgroup 
were based on only two target persons, and that although there were nine 
cooperative acts, observation of only two specific members may not suffice to 
represent a virtuous group. Engaging in this sort of impression formation process, 
participants may selectively pick up information that differentiated the two target 
persons rather than high levels of cooperation of both groups. In order to resolve this 
issue, we made four changes for the procedure of study 2. First, the instructions 
about the personality test (team assignment task) were modified so that participants 
were led to believe the credibility of this test was still in question. In this way, the 
group boundary created by arbitrary assignment might be less definitive compared 
to Study 1, and thus participants may be less likely to look for cues that differentiate 
the two groups. Second, a sanctioning system manipulation was added to test our 
hypotheses (outlined in the introduction above) concerning how attribution 
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processes may be altered by the presence of sanctions. Sanctions may provide a 
more salient explanation for the players’ behaviors than other causes, thus allowing 
us to test whether attributions to dispositional causes would be reduced in the 
presence (vs. absence) of sanctions. Third, we removed the control scenarios (i.e., 
Ingroup-Ctrl and Outgroup-Ctrl scenarios) for the reason of simplicity. Fourth, 
participants watched ten pairs of players cooperating with one another (once for 
each pair) instead of a single pair of players.  As such, participants observed only 
one out of ten players defecting against their partner, while the rest always 
cooperated.  Finally, instead of rating the behaviors of target persons, participants in 
study 2 were asked to rate their inferences about both the ingroup and outgroup 
generally, no matter which scenario they were assigned to observe. The last two 
changes could make the design a more sensitive test of our theoretical framework by 
drawing participants’ attention to group-based behaviors of the players.   
Method 
Participants 
Four hundred and sixty participants were recruited online through Mechanical 
Turk for a monetary reward of $1. The design was a 3 (interaction scenario: 
Ingroup–Ingroup vs. Outgroup–Outgroup vs. Intergroup) × 2 (sanctioning system: 
Present vs. Absent) between-subjects factorial design.  
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Procedure  
The procedures of study 2 remained as consistent as possible with Study 1 
except for the aforementioned changes. Specifically, before conducting the dot 
estimation task, participants were told that “more evidence is needed to conclude 
that whether one is an overestimator or an underestimator reveals something 
fundamental about one's psychological characteristics and personality” and “to 
investigate this issue, we will use this information to classify participants in this 
study into groups.” Since the purpose of study 2 was to test how sanctioning systems 
would influence attributions and cooperative expectations and decision making by 
providing a possible external attribution for observed cooperation, participants who 
were assigned to the sanction-present condition were introduced to the existence of a 
punisher right after they learned the rules of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The instruction 
read: “the two players were also told that a third player, Player C, was watching 
what happened. Player C did not know anything about Player A or B (e.g., didn’t 
see their photos). However, if any of them makes an unfair decision, Player C has 
been instructed to remove most of the player’s points.” Except for this manipulation, 
the other procedures remained the same for participants assigned to the sanction-
present vs. -absent conditions. Subsequently, they observed a total of 20 players 
assigned to the roles of Player 1 or Player 2 (i.e., 10 pairs) working with each other 
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in the Prisoners’ Dilemma games with their memberships, decisions and outcomes 
revealed on the screen. In each scenario, Player 2 always defected on the 2nd round, 
whereas Player 1 defected on the 3rd round. Importantly, half of the participants in 
the intergroup scenario observed ingroup players defecting against outgroup players 
first, whereas the other half observed outgroup players defecting against ingroup 
players first. After the observation phase, they were asked to rate their inferences 
about the behaviors of each team as in Study 1, namely dispositional attributions (α 
= .951 for the overestimators; α = .953 for the underestimators), behavioral 
inferences (the reliability of subscales will report in the result section), perceived 
entitativity (α = .906 for the overestimators; α = .900 for the underestimators), 
perceived outgroup threat (α = .799 for rated threat from the overestimators; α = 
.745 for rated threat from the underestimators), perceived group norms (α = .855 for 
the overestimators; α =.826 for the underestimators), and cooperative expectations 
(α =. 868 for the overestimators; α =.865 for the underestimators) (see Appendices 
4-10).  
Predictions 
Prediction 1. We predicted that when the sanctions were absent as in Study 1, 
cooperation by an ingroup player would lead to more positive dispositional 
inferences than cooperation by an outgroup player (based on the ultimate attribution 
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error).  By comparing the effects of observing intragroup cooperation among 
ingroup players vs. among outgroup players on our dependent variables, we 
expected that an ultimate attribution bias would contribute to lowered cooperative 
expectations and cooperative decisions toward outgroup partners (vs. ingroup 
partners) in the trust games. That is, despite exhibiting equally cooperative 
behaviors, pairs of ingroup players would be perceived as more dispositionally 
cooperative than outgroup players, whereas observed cooperation between outgroup 
players would be perceived as externally induced (i.e., due to a shared group 
membership), thus leading to subsequently biased cooperative decisions.   
However, for the conditions in the presence of sanctions, observing within-
group ingroup cooperation might yield less cooperative attributions/expectations for 
ingroup players compared to when the sanctions were absent. We predicted that the 
presence of sanctions would reduce dispositional attributions for ingroup 
cooperation, and thus lead to less cooperative expectations and less biased decisions, 
compared to when the sanctions were absent.  
Prediction 2. As Study 1, based on outgroup entitativity literature, we expected 
that observing cooperative intragroup interactions among outgroup players would 
reduce cooperative attributions/expectations and lead to biased decisions toward 
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outgroup players.  Although this hypothesis was not supported in Study 1 when 
comparing outgroup pairs to the control condition (i.e., interactions between 
outgroup players and unknown-identity players), Study 2 allowed us to re-test it by 
comparing the effects of observing the Outgroup-Outgroup scenario between the 
conditions with vs. without sanctions.  We expected that observations of within-
group outgroup cooperation may yield more cooperative attributions/expectations of 
outgroup players when the sanctions were present (vs. absent). Specifically, the 
presence of sanctions might reduce attributions of intragroup cooperation among 
outgroup members to their shared group membership (by providing an alternate 
external explanation). To the extent that this would reduce perceived outgroup 
entitativity, bias in expectations and decisions may also be reduced. 
Prediction 3. Observing intergroup interactions was expected to boost 
cooperative expectations about outgroup partners, and encourage less biased 
decisions in the trust games, compared to observing intragroup interactions among 
ingroup players or among outgroup players. The underlying mechanism was 
hypothesized to differ depending on individuals’ levels of group identification: 
weakly identified individuals may make more dispositional attributions of outgroup 
players (i.e., perceiving them as more dispositionally cooperative), whereas highly 
identified individuals may follow a salient group norm which highlighted the 
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normativity of intergroup cooperation (vs. observing intragroup interactions among 
ingroup players).  Further, we hypothesized that observations of intergroup 
cooperation would yield less cooperative attributions/expectations for outgroup 
players when sanctions were present (vs. absent). We predicted the presence of 
sanctions would reduce dispositional attributions of each player in intergroup 
cooperation, thus leading to less cooperative expectations.  Based on the ultimate 
attribution error, we expected that this attenuation in dispositional inferences would 
likely be greater for outgroup than ingroup players, leading to more biased decisions 
toward outgroup members, compared to when the sanctions were absent. 
Results 
Eight participants were removed from the analysis because they failed to 
recognize their assigned team, as measured by the manipulation check.  Twenty-one 
participants with completion time lower than half of the median of all the 
participants (Median = 14 minutes) were also excluded. Both criteria resulted in a 
sample size of 431 (Ingroup without sanctions = 82; Ingroup with sanctions = 57; 
Outgroup without sanctions = 76; Outgroup with sanctions = 74; Intergroup without 
sanctions = 60; Intergroup with sanctions = 82). As Study 1, scores on items related 
to dispositional attributions were standardized and averaged in order to create an 
overall score that represented the degree of dispositional attributions.  
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Ultimate Attribution Errors 
In examining the first prediction, we tested whether cooperation by ingroup 
players was more likely to be attributed to dispositional cooperativeness than 
cooperation by outgroup players; further, cooperation by outgroup players was more 
likely to lead to situational attributions (i.e., a shared group membership) in 
comparison. Dispositional attributions and attributions to a shared group 
membership9 were examined with scenario (between-subject: Ingroup-Ingroup vs. 
Outgroup-Outgroup vs. Intergroup) × sanction (between-subject: Present vs. Absent) 
× target group membership (within-subject: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) mixed-model 
ANOVAs. The main effect of membership on dispositional attributions was 
significant, F(1, 425) = 49.622, p < .001. The ultimate attribution error was 
confirmed in that ingroup players (M = .135) were rated as more dispositionally 
cooperative than outgroup players (M = -.135).  However, this effect was qualified 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to extract the factors from attributions about the 
behaviors of the two target groups. The results showed that while eight items were stably grouped 
into three factors, namely shared group membership, concern for others, and risk prevention, the 
other four items were divergently loading on different factors depending on the target groups. Since 
the nature of the groups were not the focus of the present study, and also the classification itself 
contained the variability contributed by both ingroup and outgroup, one of our key manipulations, we 
decided to adopt the four-dimensional classification of behavioral inferences from Study 1. It ended 
up that except for the strategic-cooperation subscale (α = .404 for the overestimators; α = .283 for the 
underestimators), the reliability of other subscales was at level that ranged from acceptable to high (α 
= .560 - .758).  For the results regarding risk-prevention attributions and strategic-cooperation 
attributions, please see Appendix 13.  
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by an interaction of scenario and membership, F(2, 425) = 70.613, p < .001. 
Participants observing the ingroup and intergroup scenarios rated ingroup players as 
more cooperative (Ms = .329 and .216) than outgroup players (Ms = -.536 and -
.086), F(1, 425) = 144.732, p < .001; F(1, 425) = 18.256, p < .001. Participants 
observing the outgroup scenario, on the contrary, rated outgroup players as more 
cooperative (M = .188) than ingroup players (M = -.121), F(1, 425) = 20.726, p < 
.001 (see Figure 5). The main effect of sanctions and its interaction effects were 
nonsignificant, Fs < 2.441, ps > .119 (See cell means in Table 2).  
To answer our key hypothesis – whether observations of different scenarios 
modified the ultimate attribution errors, we examined the magnitude of ultimate 
attribution errors (difference in dispositional attributions about ingroup vs. outgroup 
players) across scenarios and sanction conditions. We found that participants 
observing the ingroup scenario displayed a stronger ultimate attribution error than 
participants in the other two conditions, ts(425) ≥ 5.497, ps < .001, while 
participants observing the intergroup scenario had greater bias than those observing 
the outgroup scenario, t(425) > 6.352, p < .00110.  In conclusion, ingroup members 
were considered as more cooperative than outgroup members if participants were 
exposed to information indicative of ingroup members’ cooperativeness. In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Tukey post hoc tests were used.  
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situations when this information was not available, members from a highly 
cooperative outgroup appeared more cooperative than ingroup members. 
Furthermore, sanctions did not influence cooperativeness attribution or inference 
processes.  
 In addition to dispositional attributions, we hypothesized that observing 
intergroup cooperation might benefit cross-group affiliation by reducing attributions 
such as a shared group membership that can otherwise account for within-group 
cooperation among outgroup members. We conducted scenario × sanction × 
membership mixed-model ANOVAs on perceived accountability of a shared group 
membership. A main effect of membership and a membership × sanction interaction 
on shared-group-membership attributions were significant, F(1, 425) = 4.610, p = 
.032; F(2, 425) = 5.00, p = .026.  However, contrary to our predictions, a shared 
group membership was perceived as more accountable for behaviors of ingroup 
players (M = 3.688) than behaviors of outgroup players (M = 3.460) when the 
sanctions were absent, F(1, 425) = 9.75, p = .002, while it was regarded as equally 
accountable for both groups when the sanctions were present (Ms = 3.607 for 
ingroup vs. 3.611 for outgroup), F(1, 425) < 1.  
57 
 
Moderation by Group Identification  
We hypothesized that exposure to different scenarios might influence 
individuals with high vs. low group identification in different ways.  According to 
our intergroup attribution model (see Figure 2), we proposed that cooperativeness 
inference processes may occur via disparate routes depending on individuals’ levels 
of group identification. Among weak identifiers, observations of intergroup 
cooperation (vs. intragroup cooperation) may yield more dispositional attributions, 
in turn leading to higher cooperative expectations about outgroup members.  In 
contrast, exposure to intergroup cooperation may heighten perceived group norms 
among strong identifiers.  However, we found that the perception of group norms 
did not seem to play a role in dispositional attributions about outgroup members11.   
Based on the evidence we have presented so far – exposure to different 
scenarios affected cooperativeness attributions about outgroup members, we instead 
examined whether group identification moderated dispositional attributions about 
ingroup or outgroup members. Scenarios were coded as in the analyses above 
(Dummy 1: 1 = intergroup cooperation, 0 = ingroup cooperation; Dummy 2: 1 = 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Hierarchical linear regression analyses on dispositional attributions about outgroup members and 
decisions toward outgroup partners in the trust games were implemented with perceived group 
norms, group identification and the interaction term as predictors.  Neither group norms nor the 
interaction of group norms × group identification significantly predicted the outcome variables (ts < 
1.860, ps > .07).  
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outgroup cooperation, 0 = ingroup cooperation), and thus positive (negative) 
regression coefficients indicated that the alternative scenario increased (reduced) 
inferences about dispositional cooperativeness relative to the ingroup scenario. 
Hierarchical linear regression analyses were conducted with dummy variables, 
identification and their interaction terms predicting dispositional attributions about 
ingroup vs. outgroup members respectively. In step 1, dummy variables and 
standardized identification scores were entered into equation. In step 2, their 
interaction terms were further entered.  We were interested in whether the 
interaction term significantly predicted dispositional attributions about ingroup 
members.  The effect of observing the outgroup scenario relative to the ingroup 
scenario on dispositional attributions about ingroup players depended on 
individuals’ level of group identification (Dummy 2 × ID: β = .125, p = .033). In 
contrast, the effect of observing the intergroup scenario on dispositional attributions 
did not vary with group identification (Dummy 1 × ID: β = .024, p = .402) (see 
Table 3). Specifically, observing the outgroup scenario (relative to the ingroup 
scenario) reduced dispositional attributions about ingroup members among weak 
identifiers (coded as -1; β = -.269, p < .001) but not among strong identifiers (coded 
as 1; β = -.063, p = .340). This finding indicated that while weak identifiers 
perceived the ingroup members as less cooperative in situations where positive 
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information of the ingroup was not available, strong identifiers perceived the 
ingroup as equally positive regardless of the number of positive instances of ingroup 
members. 
As for the influence of scenarios on perceived cooperativeness of outgroup 
members, the magnitude of dispositional attributions inferred from outgroup 
behaviors in different scenarios also varied with individuals’ levels of group 
identification (Dummy 1 × ID: β = .118, p = .004; Dummy 2 × ID: β = .239, p < 
.001). For strong identifiers (with identification score 1 SD higher than the average), 
observing either the intergroup or the outgroup scenario increased perceived 
dispositional cooperativeness (Dummy 1: β = .398, p < .001; Dummy 2: β = .662, p 
< .001). For weak identifiers (with identification score 1 SD lower than the average), 
only observing the outgroup scenario but not the intergroup scenario improved 
perceived cooperativeness of outgroup members relative to observing the ingroup 
scenario (Dummy 1: β = .098, p = .218; Dummy 2: β = .268, p = .001) (see Figure 
6). These findings showed that group identification determined the extent of 
dispositional cooperativeness inferred from outgroup behaviors12.  Opposed to our 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Similar to Study 1, group identification significantly predicted perceived outgroup threat (β = .431, 
p < .001) controlling for outgroup entitativity, and the degree of threat elicited by outgroup 
entitativity depended on group identification (β = -.157, p < .001). Perception of outgroup threat by 
weak identifiers increased with their perception of outgroup entitativity (β = .206, p < .001), whereas 
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predictions, strong identifiers made more dispositional cooperativeness inferences 
about outgroup members as cooperative behaviors of outgroup exemplars increased 
(i.e., in both the intergroup and outgroup conditions), whereas this pattern was less 
pronounced for weak identifiers.  However, observing intragroup cooperation 
among outgroup players (i.e., exposure to overwhelmingly cooperative outgroup 
exemplars and lack of positive ingroup exemplars) did boost perceived 
cooperativeness about outgroup members for individuals both highly or weakly 
identified with their own group.   
Ingroup Bias – Allocations in Trust Games 
As Study 1, ingroup bias refers to preferential allocations offered to ingroup 
members over outgroup members in the trust games. The questions of interest were 
whether ingroup bias in allocations would be exacerbated or attenuated by 
observations of different scenarios or by the presence of sanctions in the scenarios. 
Allocations in the trust games were examined with a scenario (between-subject: 
Ingroup-Ingroup vs. Outgroup-Outgroup vs. Intergroup) × sanction (between-
subject: Present vs. Absent) × partner membership (within-subject: Ingroup vs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
strong identifiers perceived a similar degree of outgroup threat regardless of perceived outgroup 
entitativity (β = -.054, p = .359). Weak identifiers rated outgroup threat as 2.721 out of 7 when 
perceived entitativity was high and as 1.800 when it was low; strong identifiers rated outgroup threat 
as 4.972 and 4.466 respectively.  
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Outgroup) mixed-model ANOVA. Ingroup bias in allocations was significant, F(1, 
425) = 27.754, p < .001; allocations to ingroup partners (M = 245.47 points) were 
greater than allocations to outgroup partners (M = 219.78 points). This effect was 
qualified by an interaction of scenario and partner membership F(2, 425) = 19.343, p 
< .001. If we further compared the magnitude of ingroup bias across scenarios, only 
participants observing the ingroup and intergroup scenarios demonstrated significant 
ingroup bias, F(1, 425) = 10.342, p = .001; F(1, 425) = 51.108, p < .001: they 
allocated 61.772 points and 27.375 points more to ingroup partners (Ms = 266.770 
and 250.546) than to outgroup partners (Ms = 204.998 and 223.171) respectively. In 
contrast, participants observing the outgroup scenario seemed to prefer outgroup 
partners (M = 231.156) over ingroup partners (M = 219.091), but this trend was not 
significant, F(1, 425) = 2.174, p = .141 (see Figure 7).  
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General Discussion 
 The present studies investigated the role of dispositional attributions in 
decisions regarding cross-group cooperation, especially when individuals witness 
members of different groups demonstrating prosocial behaviors. In Study 1, we 
failed to find evidence supporting any of our predictions. The defection order of two 
observed players was one possibility that caused the nonsignificant results, but it 
was further ruled out.  In Study 2, we modified the procedure and measures in order 
to more directly examine intergroup processes. Participants observed 10 cooperative 
dyads composed of ingroup or outgroup members (instead of a pair of individual 
targets) in the absence or presence of sanctions, and they were asked to infer 
cooperative dispositions and expectations about the ingroup vs. outgroup as a whole 
(rather than specific observed targets).  We found that observing cooperative 
behaviors by outgroup players (in either intragroup or intergroup interactions) 
increased cooperativeness inferences about the outgroup, especially among 
individuals highly identified with the group.  
These findings were inconsistent with two main predictions: First, we 
predicted that cohesive outgroup interactions would induce attributions to a shared 
group membership, thus hindering perceptions of dispositional cooperativeness of 
outgroup players (Prediction 2). Second, we predicted that dispositional attributions 
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about outgroup members would be elevated only by observations of intergroup 
cooperation, which was hypothesized to heighten weak identifiers’ expectations 
about cross-group interactions and also to serve as demonstrations of group norms 
for strong identifiers (Prediction 3).  However, outgroup players were rated as more 
cooperative for strong identifiers when involved in intragroup interactions than in 
intergroup interactions. These findings suggest that contrary to the literature on 
outgroup entitativity, cohesive outgroup interactions did not lead to inferences about 
exclusive within-group reciprocity.  Instead, prosocial attributions became greater as 
the number of cooperative outgroup exemplars observed in the scenarios increased: 
perceived cooperativeness about outgroup members was highest among participants 
observing the outgroup scenario, followed by participants observing the intergroup 
scenario, and then those observing the ingroup scenario.  Further, the presence of 
sanctions did not alter cooperativeness inference processes.  In sum, these findings 
indicate that observing within-group cooperative acts by outgroup exemplars 
reduced the ultimate attribution error by increasing dispositional attributions about 
outgroup members.  This change in attributions led to attenuation of discriminative 
decisions.  
Exposure to Positive Outgroup Exemplars 
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We had expected that cooperative behaviors by outgroup members toward an 
ingroup recipient (in the intergroup scenario) should give rise to greater 
dispositional attributions about the outgroup than when the recipient was an 
outgroup member.  However, we found that even when no ingroup members were 
involved in the observed interactions, witnessing cooperation among outgroup 
players was sufficient to induce dispositional cooperativeness inferences about the 
outgroup.  The implication is that a key to encouraging cross-group cooperation is 
not necessarily demonstrations of outgroup members’ willingness to cooperate 
across group boundaries (as the mechanism depicted in our intergroup model 
implies), but the knowledge of dispositional cooperativeness of outgroup members, 
even though it results from their genuine concern about other outgroup members.  A 
possibility as to why outgroup members were judged as more cooperative following 
outgroup interactions than intergroup interactions was that exposure to only 
prosocial outgroup exemplars (i.e., the outgroup scenario) might make one’s own 
group seem less altruistic than the outgroup since outgroup members cooperated 
with each other so overwhelmingly.  According to the covariation principles in 
attribution theories (Jones & Davis, 1965), dispositions of an actor are constructed 
by comparing his/her behavior with one’s own expectation about the performance of 
the majority of people (including oneself) in a similar situation.  That is, if 
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participants had generated an idea about how to play in the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
game before their observations, they might find the highly cooperative level of 
outgroup exemplars exceeding their expectations.  Consequently, they might 
consider the outgroup to be dispositionally cooperative (Gilbert, 1998; Jones & 
Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967).   
Importantly, because we used the minimal group paradigm, there was no 
competition or animosity among the two groups (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; 
Hewstone et al., 2002), and thus participants might have felt free to cooperate with 
members from different teams, and have anticipated little preferential treatment 
within group boundaries.  In this case, cross-group cooperation might become more 
or as attractive as ingroup affiliation as the outgroup was perceived as altruistic.  In 
Foddy and colleagues (2009), members from an ingroup (i.e., psychology students) 
vs. a more stereotypically virtuous outgroup (i.e., nursing students) or a less virtuous 
outgroup (i.e., economics students) were offered to participants as potential partners 
in economic games.  They found that when the group membership of participants 
was unknown to their partners, participants chose their allocators based on relative 
prosociality of the groups; however, when their group membership was disclosed to 
the allocators (similar to our studies), they greatly favored the ingroup over the 
outgroups, in line with their expectations that ingroup allocators may reciprocate 
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more than outgroup allocators. What particularly relates to our studies is that despite 
expecting greater reciprocity from the ingroup, ingroup-favoring decisions with a 
more virtuous outgroup as an alternative option was 76%, i.e., 13% (not 
significantly) less than 89% when the outgroup was a less virtuous outgroup (p. 
421). It shows that to some extent, outgroup positivity may make cross-group 
cooperation look more appealing than ingroup affiliation. Similarly, across two 
studies, the results of allocations in the trust games also showed that ingroup bias 
was significant only for participants observing the ingroup or intergroup scenario 
but not for participants who observed only prosocial outgroup exemplars (although 
the key interaction was not significant in Study 1).  
Interplay of Behavioral Causes 
We had hypothesized that a situational cause (i.e., shared group 
memberships) might hinder inferences about dispositional cooperativeness; 
however, it was not always the case in the present studies.  For instance, outgroup 
players cooperating with each other were judged as equally cooperative as ingroup 
players; that is, cohesiveness of the outgroup did not dampen perceived prosocial 
qualities of outgroup members, as the literature on group entitativity suggests. 
Additionally, in Study 1, we found that highly identified participants tended to infer 
both dispositional attributions and shared-group-membership attributions than weak 
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identifiers.  This implies that causes like a shared group membership might not 
impede dispositional attributions, and instead the two causes can co-exist without 
cancelling out each other. When we further analyzed the correlations between the 
shared-group-membership cause and dispositional attributions in different scenarios. 
Shared-group-membership attributions positively correlated with dispositional 
attributions (rs = .166 ~ .212, ps < .05) for both the ingroup and outgroup scenarios, 
but the correlations were nonsignificant for the intergroup scenario (rs = .057 ~ .074, 
ps > .3). In other words, an outgroup actor can be considered as likely to act based 
on his group membership and still perceived as dispositionally cooperative.   
In contrast, instrumental causes such as strategic cooperation or only 
cooperating in the presence of sanctions might collide with inferences about 
dispositional cooperativeness.  Indirect evidence by Van Hiel et al. (2008) indicated 
that participants who were asked to provide possible causes for cooperative (vs. 
noncooperative) targets in commons dilemmas attributed behaviors of cooperative 
targets to a higher level of genuine concern and a lower level of greed and fear as 
opposed to behaviors of noncooperative targets.  The strategic-cooperation and risk-
prevention causes in our studies seemed to correspond to attributions to greed and 
fear.  In both studies, genuine concern positively correlated with risk prevention (rs 
= .207 ~ .327), but negatively correlated with strategic cooperation (rs = -.109 ~ -
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.267). Compared to Van Hiel et al. (2008), we obtained a much smaller magnitude 
of correlation between strategic cooperation and genuine concern, perhaps because 
the responses in present studies consisted of a high proportion of cooperative 
choices but only few uncooperative choices.  
Group Identification 
With regard to the effect of group identification, our hypothesis was that 
highly identified individuals would perceive a higher level of outgroup threat from 
intragroup interactions among outgroup members, thus leading to biased decisions 
(as the mechanism depicted in the intragroup interaction model).  However, in both 
studies, we found that although highly identified individuals perceived a higher level 
of outgroup threat, the perceived threat remained the same level regardless of 
cohesiveness among the observed players in different scenarios. Importantly, 
outgroup threat by strong identifiers seemed to be dissociated from their inferences 
about the outgroup’s dispositions.  In Study 2, the perceived differences in the 
outgroup’s dispositions inferred from the scenarios were mainly driven by strong 
identifiers, signifying that they were attentive to cooperative opportunities afforded 
by outgroup members once the information was available. Weak identifiers were not 
as responsive to information about outgroup prosociality as strong identifiers.  These 
findings seem contradictory to the CCM at first sight, but if we examine the 
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preconditions closer, the current approach and CCM emphasize different aspects of 
intergroup decisions.  The CCM posits that weakly identifiers are more likely to 
accept cross-group cooperation than strong identifiers if a favorable outcome can be 
guaranteed by cooperative affordances other than a group membership (Packer & 
Kugler, under review).  What drives weak identifiers is a temporary incentive 
afforded, for example, by the presence of sanctioning systems.  However, our 
current findings indicate that strong identifiers may engage in cross-group 
cooperation even more assertively than weak identifiers if they find that 
cooperativeness of outgroup members exceeds that of ingroup members.  
Worchel and Coutant (2004) point out that the reference group individuals 
use to identify themselves may shift during different phases of group development.  
In qualifying social identity theories, Worchel et al. (2000) propose that 
comparisons between the ingroup vs. outgroups occur upon formation of an group as 
a means to develop group identity and group boundaries, whereas comparisons 
within the ingroup become more prevalent at an later stage so as to evaluate or 
stabilize one’s own status within the group.  As such, because the minimal group 
paradigm was used in the present studies, participants may be at an early group 
development stage where the main focus was to disambiguate the relations between 
groups and to construct the representations of the ingroup vs. outgroup.  We believe 
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that individuals highly identified with the ingroup may be also those who attend to 
instances informative about intergroup relations the most at an early group 
development stage.  That may be why the instances of cooperative outgroup 
exemplars were more attributed to cooperative dispositions among strong identifiers 
(vs. weak identifiers) across the two studies.  
An alternative explanation underlying strong identifiers’ susceptibility to 
outgroup positivity is a desire to feel socially connected, especially with members 
from novel groups.  It is possible that strong identifiers were simply social 
connectors and more inclined to affiliate with people they first met and found to be 
nice. As such, they might be more responsive to positive behaviors of outgroup 
members than weak identifiers.  However, despite their high appraisals of 
outgroup’s positive behaviors, strong identifiers showed a ingroup bias in 
dispositional attributions in that they perceived ingroup members as highly 
cooperative across three scenarios where positive instances of ingroup members 
varied.  In contrast, weak identifiers accordingly made lower dispositional 
attributions about ingroup members when exposed to overwhelmingly positive 
instances of outgroup members relative to exposed to ingroup cooperation.  In sum, 
strong identifiers in the present studies seemed to demonstrate both ingroup 
preference and tendency to affiliate with positive outgroup exemplars.  
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Similar to the desire to feel socially connected, a feeling of secure may also 
come into play in situations where strong identifiers are willing to cooperate across 
group lines.  Individuals highly identified with the ingroup might also feel secure to 
search out resources that help achieve their goals.  Therefore, strong identifiers 
might feel freely to recognize cooperative outgroup members as potential resource, 
and thus have perceived them as more cooperative as their positive behaviors 
increased. In a related study, Saleem and Anderson (unpublished manuscript) found 
that individuals with secure attachment primes—they imagined that people 
surrounding them were willing to help them to solve a problem—displayed less 
implicit bias toward Arabs compared to those with either neutral or insecure primes. 
Most importantly, the secure prime attenuated the Arabic implicit bias the most 
among individuals highly identified with the ingroup (American). In this case, the 
feeling of secure indeed encouraged highly identified individuals to stray beyond 
group boundaries.   
Limitation and Future Directions 
Extended contact theories propose that the knowledge of cross-group 
friendships reduces intergroup biases via three routes: (1) demonstrating cross-group 
interactions as a group norm by ingroup exemplars, (2) providing information about 
outgroup positivity, and (3) in advance encouraging the inclusion of outgroup others 
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as part of the self (Wright et al., 1997).  Wright et al. (1997) emphasized that the 
preconditions for extended contact theories are that one needs to consider the 
ingroup exemplar as an interchangeable self, and the cross-group friendship as 
representative of intergroup relations.  Given cooperative behaviors repeatedly 
demonstrated by members from both groups in Study 2, it was unlikely that 
intergroup interactions in the observation phase failed to represent intergroup 
relations.  As such, we speculate that the nature of newly-formed groups may dilute 
the influence of group norms, leaving questions regarding the impact of ingroup role 
models.  Moreover, mere observation itself may also leave some room for 
participants to have different interpretations as to why the observed players 
cooperated with each other (e.g., experiment assignment or voluntary decision). In 
contrast, participants in Wright and colleagues’ (1997) studies were randomly 
assigned to a minimal group and observed two confederates from an ingroup vs. 
outgroup interacting in a friendly, neutral or hostile way (Study 4). Only participants 
observing friendly cross-group interactions showed no bias on evaluations on the 
outgroup target, whereas those observing neutral or hostile cross-group interactions 
evaluated the outgroup target demonstrating less positive traits and more negative 
traits.  Therefore, the effect of observing different scenarios may be altered if the 
relation between groups is manipulated. For example, observations of outgroup 
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cooperation may lead to more perceived outgroup threat and attributions to a shared 
group membership when there is competition between groups. 
In a real-world setting, people have many motives to believe that their own 
group outperforms an outgroup and that within-group cooperation would benefit 
them more than cross-group cooperation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We expect that 
our attribution model (see Figure 1) may be more applicable to existing social 
groups.  According to the extensive literature on stereotypes and intergroup bias, 
interpretations of cooperative behaviors of an outgroup are contingent on its 
stereotypes (Duncan, 1976). Outgroup behaviors are encoded in a stereotype-
consistent manner, which sets a stage for judgments in line with this biased 
information processing, especially for prejudiced people (Sherman et al., 2005).  Put 
it another way, cooperative behaviors of a stigmatized outgroup would be less 
attributable to dispositions but more attributable to a shared group membership.  
Thus, the ultimate attribution error may be especially pronounced for outgroups with 
negative stereotypes (Hewstone, 1990).  Furthermore, cooperation among outgroup 
members, in this case, might increase perceptions of cohesion, thus paving the way 
for (malicious) intentionality inferences about outgroup members, as is suggested in 
the literature on group entitativity (Dasgupta et al., 1997).  As a result, we may 
observe cooperative behaviors demonstrated by outgroup members will be less 
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appreciated and render them less promising partners compared to the same 
behaviors by ingroup members.  
In conclusion, our work lends support to existing literature that exposure to 
instances of outgroup positivity promotes future cross-group cooperation; we further 
extend the researchers’ view (e.g., Tanis & Postmes, 2005) to attribution processes 
underlying further cooperation with outgroups.  The findings suggest that 
dispositional attributions of outgroup behaviors lies at the heart of boosting 
confidence in cross-group cooperation.  The significance of our work is that 
observations of outgroup cooperative acts can transfer to a stable representation (i.e., 
dispositions) about the outgroup; furthermore, the level of perceived outgroup 
cooperativeness increases with the number of observed instances. We also captured 
that this tendency was mainly contributed to individuals highly identified with the 
ingroup, suggesting that highly identified individuals may form stable 
representations/stereotypes about outgroups at a relatively early stage of group 
development, which may plant a seed for difficulties in changing their stereotypes 
about outgroups later on.  
75 
 
References 
Abelson, R. P., Dasgupta, N., Park, J., & Banaji, M. R. (1998). Perceptions of the 
collective other. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 243–250. 
Allport, G. W. (1954).The nature of prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley. 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142. 
Blair, I.V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 242-261. 
Brewer, M. B. (2008). Depersonalized trust and ingroup cooperation. In J. I. 
Krueger (Ed.), Rationality and Social Responsibility (pp. 215–232). New 
York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Brewer, M. B., & Kramer, R. M. (1986). Choice behavior in social dilemmas: 
Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 543-549. 
Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of 
aggregates of persons as social entities. Behavioral Science, 3, 14–25. 
76 
 
Carpenter, S. & Radhakrishnan, P. (2002). The Relation between Allocentrism and 
Perceptions of In-groups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 
1528-1537. 
Cialdini, R. B. (1996). Social influence and the triple tumor structure of 
organizational dishonesty. In D. M. Messick & A. E. Tenbrunsel (Eds.), 
Codes of conduct: Behavioral research into business ethics. New York: 
Russel Sage Foundation. 
Dasgupta, N., Banaji, M. R., & Abelson, R. P. (1999). Group entitativity and group 
perception: Associations between physical features and psychological 
judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 991–1003. 
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 680–690. 
Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 265-279. 
De Cremer, D., & Van Vugt, M. (1999). Social identification effects in social 
dilemmas: A transformation of motives. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 29, 871-893. 
77 
 
Duncan, B. L. (1976). Differential social perception and attribution of intergroup 
violence: Testing the lower limits of stereotyping of Blacks. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 590–598. 
Foddy, M., Platow, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2009). Group-based trust in strangers: The 
roles of stereotypes and expectations. Psychological Science, 20, 419-422. 
Gerard, H. B., & Hoyt, M. E (1974). Distinctiveness of social categorization and 
attitude toward ingroup members. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 29, 836-842. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1998). Ordinary personology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. 
Lindzey, (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology (4th Ed.). New York: 
McGraw Hill. 
Good, D. (1988). Individuals, interpersonal relations and trust. In D. Gambetta, 
(Ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (pp. 31–48). New 
York, N.Y.: Blackwell. 
Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, J. W. (1994). Stereotypes. In R.S. Wyer, Jr., & T.K. 
Srull (Eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition (2nd Ed., Vol. 2, pp. 1-68). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
78 
 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
Hewstone, M. (1990). The ‘ultimate attribution error’?: A review of the literature on 
intergroup causal attribution. European Journal of Social Psychology, 20, 
311–335. 
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M. & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review of. 
Psychology, 53, 575–604. 
Howard , J. Rothbart , M. (1980). Social categorization and memory for ingroup and 
outgroup behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 301-
308. 
Insko, C. A., Schopler J., & Sedikides C. (1998). Personal control, entitativity, and 
evolution. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, C. A. Insko (Eds.), Intergroup 
Cognition and Intergroup Behavior (pp. 109–20). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: the attribution process 
in social psychology. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 219-266), New York: Academic Press. 
79 
 
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 15, pp. 192-238). Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Lin S. Y., & Packer, D. J. (2014). Rapid Evaluative Tuning: The Presence of 
Cooperation-Facilitating Institutions Reduces Implicit Racial Bias. Poster 
session presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Society of Personality 
and Social Psychology, Austin, TX. 
Luhmann N. (1979). Trust and Power. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. 
McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism 
scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, 
and racism. London: Academic Press. 
Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006a). When 
sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: Considering the 
presence of an alternative option to defect. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 13, 1312-1324. 
80 
 
Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D. & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006b). 
Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in 
social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 147-162.  
Newheiser, A., Sawaoka, T., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012). Why do we punish groups? 
High entitativity promotes moral suspicion. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 48, 931-936. 
Packer, D. J., & Kugler, M. B. (2013). Cooperation-enhancing social institutions 
reduce strategic intergroup biases. Working paper available at SSRN. 
Packer, D. J., & Kugler, M. B. (under review). Whom can I trust? A cooperative 
contingencies model of strategic intergroup bias. Manuscript under review. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating 
indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 
Instruments, and Computers, 36, 717–731.  
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for 
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. 
Behavior Research Methods, 40, 879–891.  
81 
 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1979). The ultimate attribution error: Extending Allport’s 
congnitive analysis of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
5, 461–476. 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1991). Normative theory in intergroup relations: Explaining both 
harmony and conflict. Psychology and Developing Societies, 3, 3-16. 
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact 
theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 751–783. 
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond 
without prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 811–
832 
Ross, L., Amabile, T. M., & Steinmetz, J. L. (1977). Social roles, social control, and 
biases in social-perception processes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 35, 485-494.  
Saleem, M., Prot, S., Anderson, C.A., (unpublished manuscript). Ingroup 
identification moderates effects of secure attachment primes on intergroup 
bias and conflict. 
82 
 
Sherman, J. W., Stroessner, S. J., Conrey, F. R., & Azam, O. (2005). Prejudice and 
stereotype maintenance processes: Attention, attribution, and individuation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 607-622. 
Stanley, D., Sokol-Hessner, P., Banaji, M. R., Phelps, E. A. (2011). Implicit race 
attitudes predict trustworthiness judgments and economic trust decisions. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 108, 7710-7715. 
Stephan, W. G., Boniecki, K. A., Ybarra, O., Bettencourt, A., Ervin, K. S., Jackson, 
L. A., McNatt, P. S., & Renfro, C. L. (2002). The role of threats in the racial 
attitudes of Blacks and Whites. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
28, 1242-1254. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An intergrative theory of intergroup conflict. In 
W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Tanis, M., & Postmes, T. (2005). A social identity approach to trust: Interpersonal 
perception, group membership and trusting behaviour. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 35, 413-424.  
83 
 
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems, decision frames, 
and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 684–707. 
Terry, D. J., & Hogg, M. A. (1996). Group norms and the attitude behavior 
relationship: A role for group identification. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 22, 776–793. 
Van Lange , P. A. M. Liebrand , W. B. G. Kuhlman , D. M. (1990). Causal 
attribution of choice behavior in three N-person prisoner's dilemmas. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 34-48. 
Van Hiel, A., Vanneste, S. & De Cremer, D. (2008). Why did they claim too much? 
The role of causal attributions in explaining level of cooperation in commons 
and anticommons dilemmas? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38, 173-
197. 
Weber, M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual review of social 
dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 8, 281–307. 
Worchel, S. & Coutant, D. (2005). It takes two to tango: Relating group identity to 
individual identity within the framework of group development. (reprint). In 
84 
 
M. Brewer & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Self and social identity. Malden: 
Blackwell. 
Worchel, S., Iuzzini, J., Coutant, D, & Ivaldi, M. A (2000). Multidimensional model 
of identity: Relating individual and group identity to intergroupp behavior. In 
R. Brown & D. Capozza (Eds.), Recent Developments in Social Identity 
Research. London: Blackwell. 
Wright, S. C., Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., & Ropp, S. A. (1997). The extended 
contact effect: Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 73–90. 
Yamagishi, T. & Kiyonari, T. (2000). The group as the container of generalized 
reciprocity. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63, 116-132. 
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Corneille, O., & Estrada, C. (2001). The interplay of subjective 
essentialism and entitativity in the formation of stereotypes. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 5, 141-155. 
Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Rogier, A. (2001). Blame it on the group: Entitativity, subjective 
essentialism and social attribution. In J. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), The 
85 
 
psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and 
intergroup relations (pp. 103-134). New York : Cambridge University Press. 
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Rogier, A., & Fiske, S. (1998). Group entitativity and social 
attribution: On translating situational constraints into stereotypes. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1090-1103.
86  
Figure 1. A
 M
odel of Intragroup C
ooperation  
!
B
ehavioral Inferences 
87  
Figure 2. A
 M
odel of Intergroup C
ooperation 
 
B
ehavioral Inferences 
88  
Figure 3. A
 M
odel of the Effect of Sanctioning System
s on A
ttribution 
B
ehavioral Inferences 
89 
 
Figure 4.  Effects of scenario x partner membership on allocations in the trust games 
in Study 1.  
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Figure 5. Effects of scenario x target membership on standardized scores on 
dispositional cooperativeness in Study 2.  
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Figure 6. Scenario x group identification predicting dispositional attributions in Study 
2. 
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Figure 7.  Effects of scenario x partner membership on allocations in the trust games 
in Study 2. 
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Table 1. Factor analysis of of causal attribution scale 
  
  
Player 1 
  
Player 2 
 
Factor 
 
Factor 
 
  
1 
2 
3 
4 
  
1 
2 
3 
4 
1. This players decisions w
ere influenced by the group 
m
em
bership of his partner. 
 
.827 
.093 
.000 
.058 
 
.864 
.002 
.005 
.041 
2. This player w
ould have m
ade different decisions if the group 
m
em
bership of his partner had been different. 
 
.830 
-.050 
.143 
.139 
 
.868 
-.073 
.128 
.059 
3. The fact that this player shared or did not share a group 
m
em
bership w
ith his partner is im
portant for understanding 
his behavior in these gam
es. 
 
.720 
.261 
-.122 
.259 
 
.664 
.131 
.017 
.013 
4. This player genuinely cared about the other player in these 
gam
es. 
 
.202 
.724 
-.094 
-.252 
 
.065 
.675 
.079 
-.318 
5. This player took the other player’s needs into account w
hen 
m
aking decisions 
 
.163 
.724 
-.004 
-.263 
 
.017 
.703 
.039 
-.339 
6. This player w
ould have behaved in the sam
e w
ay no m
atter 
w
ho he w
as playing w
ith. 
 
-.636 
.518 
.001 
.267 
 
-.712 
.149 
.193 
-.012 
7. This player w
ould have been less cooperative if his outcom
es 
did not rely on the other player 
 
.225 
-.086 
.040 
.761 
 
.187 
.212 
-.012 
.865 
8. This player expected that the other player w
ould reciprocate 
his decisions. 
 
-.152 
.734 
.095 
.223 
 
-.133 
.946 
-.103 
.450 
9. This player w
anted to m
axim
ize his ow
n payoff (points) 
 
.065 
.002 
-.050 
.848 
 
-.087 
-.063 
.142 
.697 
10. This player w
anted to avoid negative evaluations from
 the 
other player 
 
.068 
.306 
.558 
-.131 
 
.063 
.182 
.630 
-.097 
11. This player w
as afraid of being exploited by the other player 
 
-.001 
-.041 
.872 
.024 
 
-.037 
-.136 
.887 
.162 
12. This player felt unsure about taking a risk 
  
.004 
-.023 
.819 
.018 
  
-.063 
-.010 
.783 
.041 
Eigenvalue 
  
3.375 
2.050 
1.412 
1.170 
  
3.298 
2.126 
1.504 
1.018 
%
 Explained V
ariance 
  
28.123 
17.083 
11.763 
9.748 
  
27.487 
17.716 
12.529 
8.482 
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Table 2. C
ell m
eans table 
 
 
Scenario 
Sanction  
C
ondition 
M
em
bership 
N
o. of 
Participants 
Standardized 
Scores on 
D
isposition 
  
Shared G
roup 
M
em
bership 
  
C
oncern for 
O
thers 
  
R
isk 
Prevention 
  
Strategic 
C
ooperation 
  
A
llocation in 
Trust G
am
e 
(points) 
  
  
  
  
M
ean 
S.D
. 
  
M
ean 
S.D
. 
  
M
ean 
S.D
. 
  
M
ean 
S.D
. 
  
M
ean 
S.D
. 
  
M
ean 
S.D
. 
Intergroup 
Scenario 
N
o Sanction 
Ingroup 
60 
0.244 
0.645  
3.463 
1.524  
4.556 
1.296  
4.078 
1.491  
4.683 
1.426  
259.117 160.652 
 
 
O
utgroup 
60 
-0.017 
0.611  
3.217 
1.242  
4.272 
1.151  
4.006 
1.320  
4.783 
1.406  
221.617 150.777 
 
Sanction 
Ingroup 
82 
0.189 
0.673  
3.613 
1.411  
4.557 
1.321  
4.549 
1.211  
4.799 
1.342  
241.976 146.036 
 
 
O
utgroup 
82 
-0.155 
0.614  
3.601 
1.284  
4.134 
1.206  
4.265 
1.287  
5.238 
1.332  
224.726 147.263 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ingroup  
Scenario 
N
o Sanction 
Ingroup 
82 
0.348 
0.580  
3.899 
1.329  
4.780 
1.224  
4.122 
1.417  
4.421 
1.320  
239.848 154.061 
 
 
O
utgroup 
82 
-0.466 
0.839  
3.512 
1.310  
3.780 
1.398  
3.849 
1.331  
4.787 
1.237  
183.909 147.372 
 
Sanction 
Ingroup 
57 
0.310 
0.620  
3.754 
1.412  
4.596 
1.240  
4.515 
1.144  
4.526 
1.163  
293.693 145.997 
 
 
O
utgroup 
57 
-0.605 
0.662  
3.662 
1.377  
3.561 
1.147  
4.181 
1.389  
5.000 
1.188  
226.088 156.688 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
utgroup  
Scenario 
N
o Sanction 
Ingroup 
76 
-0.138 
0.791  
3.701 
1.264  
3.943 
1.275  
4.259 
1.261  
4.737 
1.147  
206.750 137.747 
 
 
O
utgroup 
76 
0.261 
0.640  
3.651 
1.364  
4.798 
1.209  
4.057 
1.280  
4.658 
1.105  
232.697 142.018 
 
Sanction 
Ingroup 
74 
-0.104 
0.672  
3.453 
1.426  
4.067 
1.352  
4.230 
1.190  
4.703 
1.271  
231.432 146.061 
  
 
O
utgroup 
74 
0.116 
0.633   
3.571 
1.259   
4.510 
1.350   
4.198 
1.167   
4.527 
1.176   
229.615 140.615 
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Table 3. R
egression analysis  
  
  
Ingroup 
  
O
utgroup 
 
 
D
ispositional 
A
ttributions 
  
 
D
ispositional 
A
ttributions 
  
Predictors 
  
B
eta 
t-value 
  
  
B
eta 
t-value 
  
Step 1 
 
R
2 = .343
** 
 
 
 
R
2 = .164
** 
 
 
 
C
onstant 
 
4.584 
** 
 
 
-9.280 
** 
 
D
um
m
y 1  
(Intergroup = 1 vs. Ingroup = 0) 
-.003 
-.076 
 
 
.284 
5.460 
** 
 
D
um
m
y 2 
(O
utgroup = 1 vs. Ingroup = 0) 
-.170 
-3.626 
** 
 
.482 
9.103 
** 
 
M
o: Identification (standardized) 
.529 
13.129 
** 
 
.076 
1.681 
 
Step 2 
 
Δ
R
2 = .008
+ 
 
 
 
Δ
R
2 = .027
** 
 
 
 
D
um
m
y 1 × ID
 
.024 
.402 
 
 
.188 
2.880 
** 
 
D
um
m
y 2 × ID
 
.125 
2.134 
* 
 
.239 
3.649 
** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Appendix 
1. Choice matrix of Prisoners’ dilemma   
 Player 1 
            Cooperate 
Player 1 
            Defect  
Player 2 
  Cooperate 
                              40 points 
40 points 
                                  60 points 
 0 points            
Player 2 
  Defect 
                                0 points 
60 points            
                                  20 points 
20 points 
 
2. Two players’ choices observed by participants in all scenarios 
Round Player 1 Player 2 
1 C C 
2 C D 
3 D C 
4 C C 
5 C C 
6 C C 
7 C C 
8 C C 
9 C C 
10 C C 
 
3. An example of five interaction scenarios 
 
 
 
 
Ingroup–Control 
Player 1         Player 2 
Underestimator   Unknown Membership 
    ↔   
Outgroup–Control 
Player 1          Player 2 
Unknown Membership   Overestimator 
 ↔  
 
   
Ingroup–Ingroup 
Player 1         Player 2 
Underestimator     Underestimator 
  ↔  
Outgroup–Outgroup 
Player 1         Player 2 
Overestimator      Overestimator 
 ↔  
Ingroup–Outgroup 
Player 1          Player 2 
Underestimator     Overestimator 
    ↔  
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4. Dispositional attributions 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
Please rate what you think this person is like DEEP DOWN, in terms of their fundamental 
personality traits. What do you think they are really like? 
1. friendly 
2. considerate 
3. thoughtful 
4. sincere 
5. kind 
6. trustworthy 
7. generous 
8. likeable 
9. cooperative 
10. egalitarian 
11. competent 
12. intelligent 
 
5. Behavioral inferences (modified from Van Hiel, Vanneste, & De Cremer, 2008) 
(1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely) 
Please indicate the possible causes of the behavior of this player? 
1. This player's decisions were influenced by the group membership of his partner. 
2. This player would have made different decisions if the group membership of his 
partner had been different. 
3. The fact that this player shared or did not share a group membership with his partner 
is important for understanding his behavior in these games. 
4. This player genuinely cared about the other player in these games. 
5. This player took the other player’s needs into account when making decisions 
6. This player would have behaved in the same way no matter who he was playing with. 
7. This player would have been less cooperative if his outcomes did not rely on the other 
player 
8. This player expected that the other player would reciprocate his decisions. 
9. This player wanted to maximize his own payoff (points) 
10. This player wanted to avoid negative evaluations from the other player 
11. This player was afraid of being exploited by the other player 
12. This player felt unsure about taking a risk 
 
6. Entitativity Scales (modified from Carpenter & Radhakrishnan, 2002) 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
Please rate the extent to which you think each statement below likely describes the group 
of [team name] 
1. They are similar in terms of their behaviors. 
2. They are similar to each other with respect to their traits. 
3. They agree about values. 
4. They are well coordinated 
5. They are efficient when they work together 
6. They are interdependent, depending on each other 
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7. Outgroup threat (for minimal group paradigm) 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
Please rate to what extent you agree or disagree with each statement  
1. I think that [group] is a strong rival to my group. 
2. I believe that [group] and [group] are highly competitive with each other. 
3. Our two groups are in competition for important resources. 
4. I feel threatened by [group]. 
5. Our groups are different from each other in important ways. 
 
8. Perceived group norms 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
Please rate to what extent you agree or disagree with each statement  
1. Watching the two players earlier gave me a strong sense of how I should behave in 
these games. 
2. I got a good understanding of how members of my group behave in these games. 
3. Watching the players provided me with useful information about how people in 
general should play these games. 
 
9. Trust/cooperative expectations  
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
Please imagine if you were the other player in the game with your picture and group 
membership revealed to this player…  
1. To what extent do you believe this player would cooperate with you? 
2. To what extent do you believe this player would be motivated to maximize your 
outcome? 
3. To what extent would you want to play with this player? 
4. To what extent would you trust this partner? 
 
10. Ingroup identification scale (Leach et al., 2004) 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I feel a bond with [group] 
2. I feel solidarity with [group] 
3. I feel committed to [group] 
4. I think that [group] has a lot to be proud of 
5. It is pleasant to be [group] 
6. I have a lot in common with the average [group] member 
7. I am similar to the average [group] member 
8. I identify with other [group] people 
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11. Political Orientation 
1. Politically, do you think you tend to be more Liberal, or Conservative? (7 Point Scale, 
Very Liberal to Very Conservative) 
2. On ECONOMIC issues, do you think you tend to be more Liberal, or Conservative? 
(7 Point Scale, Very Liberal to Very Conservative) 
3. On SOCIAL issues, do you think you tend to be more Liberal, or Conservative? (7 
Point Scale, Very Liberal to Very Conservative) 
 
12. Demographics 
Age: ______ Date of Birth: ___________  
Sex: Male (  )      Female (  )   
Education (indicate highest level achieved): 
 (  ) Grade 8 (  ) University degree or college diploma 
 (  ) Grade 10 (  ) Master’s degree  
 (  ) High school diploma (  ) Doctoral degree  
 (  ) Some university or college   
Ethnicity   
 (  ) White (  ) Hawaiian Native & Pacific Islander 
 (  ) Black or African American (  ) Hispanic/Latino(a) 
 (  ) Indian/Alaskan Native (  ) South or East Asian 
 (  ) Other  
How long have you lived in the United States? _______________ 
Is English your first language:  (  ) Yes     (  ) No 
If no, at what age did you learn English? ___________________ 
100 
 
13. Additional analyses  
STUDY 1 
Dependent variables: (1) situational attributions including risk prevention and 
strategic cooperation; (2) group perceptions including perceived group norms, 
perceived entitativity, and outgroup threat were examined between the conditions 
with only ingroup players involved (i.e., Ingroup-Ingroup and Ingroup-Ctrl scenarios) 
and the conditions with only outgroup players involved (i.e., Outgroup-Outgroup and 
Outgroup-Ctrl scenarios). Responses to the two players in the Ingroup-Ingroup and 
Outgroup-Outgroup scenarios were averaged for participants in the homogeneous 
conditions, whereas for the control conditions, scores were based only on the player 
with his team membership revealed (ingroup or outgroup).  Dependent variables were 
analyzed with 2 (scenario type: Homogeneous vs. Control) x 2 (player membership: 
Ingroup vs. Outgroup) between-subject factorial ANOVAs.   
The results showed that there was a significant main effect of player 
membership on strategic-cooperation attributions, F(1, 258) = 4.633, p = .032. 
Opposed to our predictions, ingroup players were considered to be more strategic (M 
= 5.055) than outgroup players (M = 4.746) (we will discuss implications of this 
later).  With respect to perceived group norms, we found a significant main effect of 
scenario type, F(1, 258) = 7.779, p = .006, which was qualified by a scenario type × 
player membership interaction, F(1, 258) = 5.566, p = .019. Observing the Ingroup-
Ingroup scenario (M = 4.990) elevated perception of a clear group norm compared to 
its control condition (M = 4.444 for Ingroup-Ctrl scenario), F(1, 258) = 5.041, p = 
.026, while observation of the scenarios involving outgroup players did not influence 
perception of group norms (M = 4.129 for Outgroup-Outgroup scenario; M = 4.373 
for Outgroup-Ctrl scenario), F(1, 258) = 2.053, p = .29. None of other effects was 
significant, Fs ≤ 3.817.  
STUDY 2 
 Dependent variables including (1) situational attributions including risk 
prevention and strategic cooperation; (2) group perceptions including perceived group 
norms, perceived entitativity and outgroup threat were examined with scenario 
(between-subject: Ingroup-Ingroup vs. Outgroup-Outgroup vs. Intergroup) × sanction 
(between-subject: Present vs. Absent) × target group membership (within-subject: 
Ingroup vs. Outgroup) mixed ANOVAs. With respect to the inferences about risk 
prevention, participants considered behaviors of ingroup players (M = 4.292) to be 
more risk-preventive than behaviors of outgroup players (M = 4.093), F(1, 425) = 
7.72, p = .006.  Also, players in the sanction-present condition (M = 4.323) were 
perceived as more risk-preventive than players in the sanction-absent condition (M = 
4.062), F(1, 425) = 6.40, p = .01.  
The only evidence that confirmed our prediction was a significant interaction 
of membership × scenario on strategic cooperation, F(2, 425) = 6.39, p = .002.  
Participants observing ingroup or intergroup scenarios thought that strategic 
cooperation was more accountable for outgroup behaviors (Ms = 4.893 and 5.011) 
than ingroup behaviors (Ms = 4.474 and 4.741), F(1, 137) = 11.75, p < .001; F(1, 140) 
= 5.67, p = .02; however, participants observing outgroup scenario rated strategic 
cooperation as equally accountable for behaviors of both groups (M = 4.720 for 
ingroup; M = 4.593 for outgroup), F(1, 148) = 1.50, p = .22. Although we did not 
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observe the effect of sanctions on cooperativeness inferences, it seemed that the 
presence of sanctions increased attributions to strategic cooperation for outgroup 
behaviors.  
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